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Abstract 
 
The bilateral relationship between China and Tonga has existed for almost fifteen 
years, expanding from an initially limited scope to encompass trade, education, 
tourism, culture and defence. While China has rapidly expanded its official 
relationship with Tonga, this expansion has created tensions within Tongan society 
generated by fears of Chinese immigrants taking jobs and businesses. These tensions 
boiled over in 2006, as Tongans rioted in the capital Nuku’alofa against Chinese 
shopkeepers over perceived unfair competition. The aftermath of the Nuku’alofa riots 
has seen an increasing awareness from China of the need to educate Tongans to its 
presence in their country, and its goals on the world stage. This new awareness has 
resulted in China adopting a number of approaches to educate Tongans as part of its 
expanding engagement. Education has become a central plank of this new-found 
education campaign, with China introducing several programmes to expose Tongan 
students to its culture and values, including scholarships for tertiary students to 
study within China. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the correlation between 
China’s increasing political and economic engagement with Tonga, and the increasing 
use of education programmes such as scholarships to educate Tongans about China 
and its culture and values. To accomplish this, the political and economic ties 
between China and Tonga will be analysed, as will the soft power initiatives that 
China has undertaken. These will then be analysed to test whether or not the increase 
in soft power initiatives is due to the expansion of political and economic ties 
between the two countries.  This will allow the use of soft power by China in Tonga to 
be compared to the trends evident in other South Pacific states, to determine whether 
Tonga is a unique case or whether China is undertaking these policies across the 
region.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Soft power has become an important tool to gain and improve the support of 
other states and their peoples. It has become an attractive alternative to hard power 
because it does not require the use of coercion or threats, which makes states more 
attractive. The concept has become an attractive tool in China, following its response 
to the Asian Financial Crisis of the 1990’s, when it provided aid and assistance to 
Asian economies, such as Thailand and Indonesia. It has also been adopted to gain 
favour in regions of the world such as Africa, hitherto ignored by the US. China has 
become an active player in the South Pacific, gradually overtaking other players, such 
as the United States, in influence held within the region. This rise of China in the 
South Pacific has been associated with a rise in problems associated with Chinese 
citizens in the region, such as unregulated immigration, criminal activity by Chinese 
criminal gangs, and a growing unpopularity of Chinese business practices in the 
region. To this end, China has turned to education, a soft power tool, to improve its 
image among the peoples of the South Pacific. The academic research is still in its 
infancy, with the literature on the subject very limited. This has made China’s use of 
soft power a relatively unknown area. This makes the need to better understand it 
more important, especially in areas where it is a new player. It is for this reason that 
China’s use of soft power in Tonga must be analysed. It is being used by China in the 
form of educational programmes, such as scholarships to study at universities in 
China. The role that it is playing in China’s relationship with the South Pacific is a 
relatively new concept in the field of South Pacific politics. Because of this, it remains 
relatively under-researched by experts. To contribute to this academic debate, this 
thesis will test the hypothesis that China is using scholarships to enhance its soft 
power in the South Pacific, as part of its quest to for greater political and economic 
engagement. This phenomenon can be more effectively analysed by focusing on a 
single country as a case study. The role of Chinese scholarships in creating and 
enhancing soft power in Tonga will be analysed, as part of a wider examination of 
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Chinese soft power in the region. The importance of this hypothesis to the academic 
debate lies in the unique characteristics of China’s implementation of soft power and 
the lack of scholarship on the subject, the latter being the most important. This has 
created large gaps in the understanding of the concept. The nature of China’s 
relationship with Tonga, especially the role that dependence plays in the relationship, 
has influenced the nature of China’s use of soft power. The hypothesis that will be 
tested in this thesis is important to the academic debate, because it identifies and 
analyses an aspect of soft power that is not well-known or understood in the 
academic field, despite having considerable influence over its implementation by 
China. 
 
Soft power is the use of ideas, culture and institutions to tacitly attract others 
to follow a state. The concept was first put forward by Joseph S. Nye in his book, 
Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power. It seeks to differentiate itself 
from the more traditional hard power by attracting others through the use of co-
optive power rather than coercive power. The concept rests on three basic tenets; 
culture, political values, and institutions. These are important because they allow 
states to shape the preferences held by other states, which enables them to attract 
those states towards their side. Nye argues that where a state’s culture and values are 
universal in nature, and its institutions able to shape international rules, it can 
effectively shape the preferences of other states.1 The ability to shape the preferences 
of other states is important to international relations, because it gives states power 
that is perceived to be less risky than other forms of power. The commanding role of 
the US as a cultural icon across the globe highlights the role that soft power plays in 
the international system. Soft power is transmitted to other states through a number 
of alternative methods to traditional ways of wielding power. One way that a state’s 
culture is transported to other societies is through the use of educational exchanges.2 
Another example is the use of institutions within the international system, such as the 
UN. Western powers used their position within the UN to push for the protection of 
democracy and human rights in the UN charter.3 The two examples highlighted show 
                                                        
1 Nye, Jr., Joseph S, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 
p.11 
2 Nye, Jr., Joseph S, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), p.85 
3 Nye, Soft Power, p.10 
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the way that soft power works, and how it has differentiated itself from the 
traditional forms of power. Critics, such as neo-realist scholar Stephen Walt, have 
argued that the key aspects of it, such as attraction and imitation, are not forms of 
power.4 They also argue that popularity measured by opinion polls is temporary, and 
because of that cannot be taken seriously.5 These criticisms are aimed at the lack of 
complete control that states hold over soft power. Nye has argued that it is not 
completely within the control of states and often comes from non-state actors, which 
makes it hard to use, easy to lose and costly to re-establish.6 Much of the criticism 
levelled is based on this statement, because unlike hard power, soft power is 
influenced by perceptions, values, and other actors. This criticism exposes significant 
flaws in the theoretical framework, which require better understanding if the concept 
is to be applied to China’s relationship with the South Pacific. 
Because soft power’s focus is on attraction rather than coercion, this makes 
knowledge, understanding, and branding crucial to enhancing the amount of soft 
power that states wield. The role that knowledge and understanding plays has meant 
that education has become a significant tool. This is because it can be created or 
enhanced by educating those citizens of the state you are seeking to attract about 
your culture, values and heritage. Nye emphasised the importance of these values in 
creating the attraction that is important, and education has proved crucial to 
informing outsiders about your culture. This is because education is recognised 
globally as a significant part of life, and is widely attended by children and young 
adults almost everywhere. Education has been associated with soft power since the 
term was first coined by Nye, in Bound to Lead. This makes it an important tool to use, 
because it ensures that a large audience is exposed to the message that states are 
trying to communicate. Education has become a crucial tool in the soft power 
arsenals of several states, many of whom wield great amounts. 
One state that uses education as part of its arsenal is the US. The US possesses 
a great deal of power, which it wields across much of the globe. Education has 
become an integral part of the US’s soft power arsenal, influencing the opinions of 
citizens from countries it traditionally competes with for power. One such example of 
this is the US’s position as an attractive destination to send students for tertiary 
                                                        
4 Nye, Soft Power, p.18 
5 Ibid 
6 Nye, The Future of Power, p.83 
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education. The US’s university system has developed a reputation for excellence, 
which has resulted in the children of influential figures being sent to the US for higher 
education.7 Nye states that students who study in the US often assume leadership 
roles later in life that enable them to affect policy outcomes favourable to the US.8 The 
case of the US highlights the significance attached to education in the field of soft 
power. 
 
This concept has led to a theoretical split between those who consider 
economic power to be a form of soft power and those who consider it a hard power 
tool. This theoretical split has been led by Joshua Kurlantzick, who argues that China 
is using its economic power as a form of soft power, to attract developing states and 
those disaffected with the policies of the US.9 China uses its history as a developing 
state and one that was subjected to colonialism at the hands of Western powers to 
emphasise its kinship with other developing states, as an alternative to the other 
established superpowers. Kurlantzick argues that the combination of China’s 
economic model, which refuses to accept the US orthodoxy of leaving it solely to the 
free market, and its use of diplomacy, has allowed it to develop significant appeal 
among developing states.10 This model has proved attractive largely due to the 
success China has experienced by using it. The successful combination of private 
enterprise openness, a large state sector, and stalling of democratic reform has 
allowed China to expand and improve its economy, and become a superpower that is 
competing with the US. China has used its economic strength to become influential in 
providing financial aid to developing states, as part of its diplomatic strategy. This has 
greatly enhanced China’s standing among developing states, who appreciate the 
provision of assistance without the strings attached that Western powers 
traditionally require, such as good governance requirements and free market reforms. 
It is in this respect that Kurlantzick’s “Charm Offensive” model splits from the 
traditional definition of soft power. Nye’s definition argues that economic power is 
not soft power because it coerces rather than attracts. In regards to China, its 
                                                        
7 Nye, Joseph S., "Soft Power and Higher Education", 2004, 
http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/ffpiu043.pdf (accessed May 26, 2012), p.43 
8 Ibid 
9 Kurlantzick, Joshua, "China's Charm Offensive", Commentary, vol. 122, no. 3, 2006, p.37 
10 Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm Offensive”, p.36 
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economic model encompasses aspects of both forms of power. As Kurlantzick 
identifies, China’s economic model has created significant levels of attraction among 
developing states. In contrast to this, China’s provision of financial aid to developing 
states can be identified as hard power, due to the coercive nature of aid distribution. 
This theoretical split in the relationship between economic power and soft power is 
important, because it identifies and provides an explanation for the role that 
economic power is playing in China’s foreign policy. However, China is now seeking 
to expand its soft power into other sectors.  This split does however create a need to 
identify which type of soft power to use for this analysis. For the analysis of China’s 
use of scholarships in the South Pacific as part of its quest for greater soft power, the 
revision of Nye’s framework put forth by Kurlantzick is more appropriate. This is 
because China’s use of aid provision in Tonga has enabled it to adopt the soft power 
initiatives being analysed. Kurlantzick’s revision is better able to take this into 
account than the original framework put forth by Nye. 
 
The South Pacific provides an effective case study for this analysis, because it 
presents several unique characteristics that differentiate it from China’s other 
relationships. This makes it an important test case for the academic field, because the 
nature of China’s relationship with Tonga provides important insights into the way it 
implements soft power initiatives in the region. This relationship is dominated by 
economic dependence on the part of Tonga, due to its lack of exports, and 
underdeveloped tourism industry. This weak economy has made Tonga dependent 
on Chinese aid and loans, which make up a considerable proportion of its GDP. This 
dependence has influenced the nature of the relationship, which has dictated the way 
that China uses soft power in the country Economic dependence has made China’s 
relationship with Tonga considerably different from its other relationships in the 
region, which makes it an important case, in need of greater analysis. 
Definitions 
 
 Because the analysis being undertaken in this paper will focus on a number of 
concepts, terms must be defined before the analysis can proceed. These terms are 
important to the analysis because they frame the argument, and as such must be 
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defined to ensure the argument is focused on addressing the hypothesis. Three terms 
have been selected that are in need of definition, these are; the South Pacific, culture 
and values. 
 The South Pacific is a geographic region south of Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Taiwan, and Japan, encompassing the regions of Melanesia, Micronesia, and 
Polynesia.11 For the purposes of this analysis, the definition of South Pacific will be 
drawn from that used by the UN statistics division. This definition states that Oceania 
consists of the independent states of Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, New Caledonia, 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Northern Marianas Islands, Palau, American 
Samoa, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and the 
Wallace and Futuna Islands.12 The use of the term South Pacific in this thesis will 
refer to the countries within these boundaries, south of the equator. This will exclude 
the states of Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Northern 
Marianas Islands, and Palau, as they are north of the equator. 
Culture is a term that has importance across several academic fields. It has 
been an important part of the fields of anthropology and sociology, but has 
increasingly become significant to political science. Because of this, the term culture 
will be defined from the sociological definition. According to the Oxford Dictionary of 
Sociology, “culture is all that in society which is socially rather than biologically 
transmitted. Culture is thus a general term for the symbolic and learned aspects of 
human society”.13 The SAGE Dictionary of Sociology also provides an important 
definition for culture. According to SAGE, “the culture of a society is the totality of its 
shared beliefs, norms, values, rituals, language, history, knowledge and social 
character”.14 Drawing on these two definitions, in this analysis culture will refer to 
socially transmitted beliefs, norms, language and values within a society. This will 
guide the analysis of the effect that China’s scholarship programmes have had on the 
                                                        
11 Everett-Heath, J., ‘Concise Dictionary of World Place-Names’, 2010, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t209.e5461 (accessed 
27 August 2012), p.1 
12 UN Statistics Division, ‘Composition of macro geographical (continental) regions, geographical sub-
regions, and selected economic and other groupings’, 2011, 
http://millenniumindicators.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#oceania (accessed 27 
August 2012) 
13 Scott, J., & G. Marshall, Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
p.133 
14 Bruce, S., and S. Yearley, The Sage Dictionary of Sociology (London: Sage Publications, 2006), p.58 
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understanding of Chinese culture, and its effect on the quest for greater political and 
economic engagement with Tonga. 
Values play an important role in politics, with values influencing almost every 
action taken by states, such as by influencing decision-making. The term values must 
be clearly defined to ensure that future analysis is appropriately targeted towards the 
right area. According to the SAGE Dictionary of Sociology, “they are ethical principles 
and ideals: statements of what should be, rather than what is”.15 The Oxford 
Dictionary of Sociology goes further, defining values as, “ideas held by people about 
ethical behaviour or appropriate behaviour, what is right or wrong, desirable or 
despicable”.16 Drawing from these definitions, the term values that is used in the 
analysis will refer to the ethical principles and values held by individuals and 
societies about behaviour. 
The definitions provided here for the terms South Pacific, culture, and values 
will be crucial to the analysis that will take place in this paper. This is because they 
ensure that the analysis focuses on the relevant area, and obtains the correct 
information. 
 
Chinese culture and values in foreign policy 
 
 As a result of Beijing’s foreign policy expansion, culture and values have 
become an important aspect of the ideas being implemented within the field of 
Chinese foreign policy. This is part of a wider effort by China to use foreign policy to 
allay fears that it is seeking to threaten the established world order. China is using 
foreign policy to counter this idea, through the use of strategies such as the “peaceful 
rise” theory, which describes China’s foreign policy approach as seeking to emphasise 
its peaceful nature. This approach includes a focus on attraction-based approaches, of 
which Chinese culture and values have become a significant component. Culture is 
being used by China in its overseas education institutions to show outsiders a 
favourable image of China. This is evident in the expansion of Confucius Institutes in 
tertiary institutions across the world. These institutes are non-profit organisations 
aligned with the Chinese government, whose aim is to provide teaching about 
                                                        
15 Bruce & Yearley, SAGE Dictionary of Sociology, p.314 
16 Scott, J., & G. Marshall, Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, p.685 
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Chinese culture and language and to support cultural exchanges.17 These Confucius 
Institutes allow China to integrate its culture into its foreign policy agenda, which 
contributes to its aim of changing the perception that China’s rise threatens the 
established international order. 
The same is true of Chinese values, which have become significantly 
integrated within the Chinese foreign policy arena. China’s values are an important 
part of its appeal, due to their alternative nature to those of the US. Chinese values 
have been built on its history of religion, philosophy, and its history of economic and 
political subjugation by Western powers. This has influenced its values, and the 
decisions China has made as a country. China has taken advantage of this history to 
emphasise its shared anti-colonialist sentiment with other developing states. China’s 
history of being subjected to repeated incursions and repression at the hands of 
external forces have shaped its values to focus on self-reliance, and suspicion towards 
the outside world. This has led to China possessing political values that are semi-
authoritarian in nature, and emphasise an alternative to the Western “Washington 
Consensus” approach. China has cultivated political values such as experimentation 
and innovation, especially when it comes to economic development. Chinese values 
also include a focus on a “top-down” approach to economic management, in large 
part due to its authoritarian system. This approach emphasises the crucial role of the 
state in guiding the economy, both to ensure economic prosperity and to ensure 
political stability. These values have become very attractive to developing states, 
which do not want to be held hostage by the Washington Consensus, and also want to 
maintain political stability within their countries. Jeffrey Garten highlights the 
increasing attractiveness of Chinese political values when he states that;  
“The Chinese economic model could also become an attractive alternative to the 
free market fundamentalism that the U.S. is so fond of trying to push onto other 
countries. It hasn't gone unnoticed in Asia that the more highly controlled 
Chinese economic system survived the late-1990s financial crisis in the region, 
and is handling the Global Financial Crisis very well, while U.S. disciples such as 
Thailand and South Korea imploded”. 18 
 
The example provided here highlights the increasingly important role that 
Chinese political values are playing in its foreign policy. The growing importance of 
                                                        
17 Confucius Institute Online, "Introduction to the Confucius Institutes", 2009,  
http://college.chinese.cn/en/article/2009-08/29/content_22308.htm (accessed November 21 2012) 
18 Garten, Jeffrey E., "China: The Missing Member at the G-8 Table", 2004,  
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-missing-member-g-8-table (accessed November 21 2012) 
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Chinese culture and values is evidence of the increasing importance of soft power to 
the field of Chinese foreign policy. 
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Methodology 
 
This section will identify the research method that was used to gather data for 
the analysis of China’s education scholarships in the South Pacific. To accomplish this, 
the section will first identify and briefly explain the problem that was solved. Next the 
chosen research method will be examined, including an identification of the variables 
involved and an explanation of potential limitations that faced this analysis. Finally, 
the chosen research method will be justified by identifying alternative research 
methods that were not chosen and an explanation of why this method was chosen. 
 The objective of this analysis was to show that China is using soft power as a 
way to prepare for greater political and economic engagement with distant regions of 
the world. To accomplish this, the analysis focused on China’s provision of education 
scholarships, to measure how they affected the perception of China held by those 
outside of the country. This analysis was targeted at the South Pacific, within the time 
period between 2000 and the present. This allowed for a range of data to be gathered, 
which widened the scope of the analysis and allowed more data to be accessed. 
 The analysis within this paper was based on a qualitative model, using data 
analysis of statistics and a case study approach. These research methods were 
appropriate for the type of analysis being undertaken, because they were able to 
identify and examine the extent to which education is enhancing soft power. This was 
primarily due to the freedom afforded to the case study approach, which enabled the 
research to focus on the China-Tonga bilateral relationship, rather than a regional 
focus. There were several variables that had to be taken into account when 
undertaking this analysis. These variables affected the analysis, because they were 
largely out of the control of the researcher, so could not be prevented from occurring. 
These variables included the sensitivity of the subject area, the ability of governments 
to provide the necessary statistics, and the originality of this research. The most 
significant of these variables was the sensitivity, because it determined whether or 
not the Tongan and Chinese governments were prepared to release data for this 
analysis. This was a major limitation to the analysis of Chinese soft power, along with 
several others that will be identified. Other limitations that affected this analysis 
include the originality of the field, the scope for research, and the amount of time that 
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was available to conduct research. Since this research was focused on an area that 
had not been examined before, this limited the access to past research to help guide 
the analysis. Because of this, the analysis was limited in what it covered. The focus on 
the South Pacific for this analysis also limited the research, because Chinese 
engagement with the region is a fairly recent occurrence, which meant that there was 
a limited range of evidence available to analyse. Finally, the one-year time limit on 
this thesis reduced the scope of the research. 
 The decision to choose data analysis and the case study approach as the 
primary methods of research was made after considering other research methods. 
These alternative research methods included; survey distribution and interviews. 
Because these methods focus on gathering attitudes and opinion, they are subject to 
ethical standards and political consideration from the countries or institutions that 
are affected by this research. Due to this, data analysis and a case study were chosen 
as the primary research methods. Apart from the advantage of avoiding potentially 
sensitive political issues, these methods enable the researcher to take a more 
intimate focus on the hypothesis. This was because the data could be analysed from a 
number of different scenarios. It is this freedom and flexibility compared to alternate 
research methods that made data analysis and a case study the most effective tools 
for this research. 
 After taking into account the problem that needs to be solved, the primary 
research methods and variables involved with these methods, and the reasons why 
these methods were chosen ahead of alternative options, it can be seen that survey 
distribution and interviews were the most appropriate ways to collect data for this 
thesis. 
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Chapter Two: 
Literature Review 
 
Soft Power: a theoretical framework 
 
The previous chapter explained the concept of soft power and its 
establishment by Joseph S. Nye. To fully understand the framework, this section will 
now review Nye’s work on the concept, involving an appraisal of the arguments made 
by Nye, and an analysis of the conclusions and observations made. This will introduce 
an analytical framework to guide the later review of the academic literature. 
 
Review 
 
 Nye bases his establishment of soft power on three fundamental arguments. 
These arguments are crucial to the framework because they explain why soft power 
is effective and necessary in the international system. To properly analyse this, the 
three fundamental arguments will be examined in detail. These three arguments are; 
the idea that soft power rests on the ability to shape preferences, it is more effective 
in similar cultures than widely dissimilar cultures, and that it is able to effectively 
manage the evolving state of power. 
 
 Nye argues in Bound to Lead that the strength of co-optive power lies in its 
ability to shape the preferences of others.19 Nye goes on to argue that soft power 
“currencies” are important for shaping those preferences that attract states towards 
others, because they are what drive transactions between states. To analyse the 
importance of these currencies to Nye’s argument, three will be examined in relation 
to the argument made by Nye. These currencies are; culture, domestic institutions, 
and foreign policy. Nye formulates that culture is important for spreading soft power 
because it can attract others when it is similar to the culture of the states it is seeking 
                                                        
19 Nye, Joseph S., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 
1990), p.31 
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to attract. The massive appeal of brands such as Apple, McDonalds and Nike, in 
countries such as Japan, China and Korea are evidence of the strength of culture as a 
source of attraction. This use of culture as a driver is significant, because culture is 
never static, which allows it to adapt to the changing nature of power, which is a 
significant aspect of soft power. This is because culture exists at several levels, 
affecting different types of individuals. Nye argues that this is important, because it 
allows states to attract others through their culture, from the elite level to the level of 
individuals.20 Nye also states that when culture is universalistic in nature it is more 
effective at attracting outsiders.21 US cultural icons like McDonalds, Apple and other 
big name brands have infiltrated states like China, which have created a demand 
among newly-emerging middle classes for these products, which are viewed as a 
status symbol.22 This argument made by Nye is significant, because it highlights the 
advantage that culture holds over more traditional tools for power projection. This is 
because power has traditionally been developed and projected using economic 
strength or military might, which is not necessarily effective at creating attraction at 
multiple levels, whereas individuals and states are exposed to culture at multiple 
levels. Nye highlights the case of the Vatican, which holds considerable soft power 
despite having a relatively small military and economic strength.23 This suggests that 
the Vatican draws strength from its culture of Catholicism. This example highlights 
the importance of culture in shaping preferences, because it attracts at various levels. 
The second currency identified by Nye as crucial is domestic institutions. This 
refers to the values and politics of states, and the impact that they have on soft power. 
Nye argues that they are important because they create attraction by highlighting the 
beliefs held by a state or organisation, which affects the level of power they possess.24 
Nye also argues that domestic politics play a significant role because they can either 
attract or repel outsiders. The relationship between these two domestic institutions 
and their impact is important, because these values and policies guide the actions of 
states, which has an impact on the influence that they are able to develop. Values are 
                                                        
20 Nye, Joseph S., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), p.84 
21 Nye, Joseph S., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 
p.11 
22 Goodman, D. "People's Republic of China", in R. Robison and D. Goodman (ed.) The New Rich in Asia 
(London: Routledge, 1996), p.226 
23 Nye, Soft Power, p.9 
24 Nye, Soft Power, p.11 
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important within the international system because they determine the type of 
behaviour that is pursued by individuals and states. This is significant, because Nye 
argues that states are attracted to other states that share similar values to them, and 
are repelled by those who possess values that are abhorrent to that state.25 This 
affects soft power because it relies on attraction to create the power that states wield 
within the international system. Nye identifies the US as a state whose values are 
attractive to others, because they are universalistic in nature.26 This suggests that the 
US possesses increased power due to the way that the values of the US have 
influenced its decisions. Nye identifies domestic politics as playing a similar role to 
domestic values in generating soft power. However, domestic politics are much more 
susceptible to harming a state’s image. This is argued by Nye using examples from the 
history of the US. He states that the US policy of segregation severely undercut its 
image in Africa, while the policy towards human rights enhanced it in Latin 
America.27 This is significant to the academic literature, because it highlights the 
importance of domestic politics. The examples used by Nye suggest that domestic 
politics are important because they influence the way that states are perceived by 
outsiders. The two examples highlight this because domestic policies introduced by 
the US had direct impacts on the perception held towards it by outsiders. 
The third currency that Nye identifies is foreign policy. The role of foreign 
policy is important, because it portrays the goals and interests of states towards the 
outside world. Nye says that the policies pursued by states can reinforce or squander 
the soft power possessed by that state.28 This is because the policies put forward by 
states can be perceived as hypocritical, arrogant, or indifferent, among other negative 
perceptions. This is significant, because it suggests that perception plays an 
important role in the image portrayed through foreign policy. This perception is 
difficult to control, which is highlighted by Nye when he argues that “soft power may 
appear less risky than military or economic power, but it is often hard to use, easy to 
lose, and costly to re-establish”.29 This statement made by Nye highlights the 
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importance of foreign policy to soft power, because it dictates the image that is 
portrayed to outsiders. 
 
 The three soft power “currencies” identified by Nye, and analysed in this 
section, have been shown to be a crucial argument within the academic literature. 
This is because they have been shown to shape preferences, create attraction and 
develop an image of states. These arguments have been shown to be significant 
through the examples provided. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 The conclusions reached by Nye are important to the academic literature, and 
as such must be analysed and interpreted. The three conclusions reached by Nye that 
must be analysed are; the importance of soft power will increase, the complex nature 
of it, and that its rise is not solely due to government actions, which makes it more 
difficult to wield. 
 Nye’s first conclusion states that changes in the international system mean 
that soft power will become more important, as the international system evolves. He 
states that the increasingly globalised world will make power more diffuse, as power 
is increasingly wielded by NGOs, transnational networks and traditional states. This, 
Nye argues, makes soft power more important, because it is able to evolve alongside 
the information revolution and removal of borders, which makes power more fluid. 
This conclusion is significant, because it highlights its strength compared to the 
traditional forms of power. The ability to be developed and projected by non-state 
actors can be considered a significant contributor to Nye’s conclusion. This is because 
as access to power becomes more available, it will become more important, because 
more groups will look to access soft power, making it more valuable. Nye highlights 
the role of corporations, terrorist networks, and non-profit organisations as examples 
of its use by non-state actors.30 This example is important to the conclusion reached 
by Nye, because it highlights the types of organisations that are benefiting from the 
diffusion of power. This conclusion suggests that the current literature has identified 
an area of research that has not been examined by scholars to date. 
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 The second conclusion made by Nye argues that many variables exist that 
both constrain and enhance a state’s soft power, and that these variables determine 
the success or failure of a states’ efforts. Nye concludes that states must make use of 
multiple communications channels, have a dominant culture and values, and have 
domestic and foreign policies that enhance their credibility.31 He suggests that the US 
and European states may benefit from these variables.32 This conclusion is significant 
to the academic literature, because it suggests that soft power is reliant on certain 
circumstances playing out. These circumstances can include democracy, human 
rights, military prowess, and the strength of an economy can all contribute to the 
enhancing or limiting of a state’s power. This suggestion is important, because it 
highlights its complicated nature. This suggests that it should be interpreted as 
higher risk, but with a higher reward than the likes of military or economic power. 
This is evident if the argument put forward by Nye is compared to arguments put 
forward for military and economic power. Advocates of hard power argue that power 
is attained through the use of coercion, either by military strength or economic 
inducements, such as financial aid. Nye has countered that while these forms of 
power are still important within the international system, the evolving nature of 
power means that they are not able to decide all situations.33 Economic power rests 
on political frameworks, which means that in times of great uncertainty, frameworks 
can fail.34 Nye uses the example of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, where previously 
strong Asian economies were struck by financial crisis, which resulted in emerging 
economies such as Russia and Brazil being undercut.35 Nye argues that because soft 
power relies on perception and attraction, it is more concerned about consequences 
and side-effects from the actions that states take. Nye argues that this reliance on 
perception and attraction means that it is dependent on a number of conditions to be 
successful, such as culture, values and policies. This suggests that despite it being 
riskier to use than more traditional forms of power, the benefits are greater than 
those from military or economic power. 
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 Nye’s third conclusion, that the rise of soft power is not due solely to 
government actions, is significant to the academic field because it highlights the key 
difference it possesses, compared with hard power. In his work, Nye concludes that 
soft power is a social and economic by-product rather than a result of official 
government action. This conclusion reached by Nye is a significant contribution to its 
understanding, and of power in general, because it identifies and expands on the 
relationship of society and the economy with power, not as primary creators but as 
influencers. Nye’s conclusion suggests that it occurs as a by-product of interactions, 
which is a new insight into the concept of power in international relations. This is 
because the academic debate on power has until recently focused on the role of the 
state in creating and projecting power within the international system. Nye’s focus on 
“currencies”, such as culture, values and institutions, are important to this 
contribution because they are examples of how influence fuels soft power rather than 
direct actions. This suggests that Nye’s contribution to the academic debate on power 
has been significant, because it seeks to identify an aspect of power that is not widely 
recognised or analysed by the academic literature. Nye’s conclusion has also gone 
some way to disproving claims made by sceptics, who claim that attraction and 
imitation are not forms of power.36 The conclusion that Nye reaches is significant in 
highlighting shortcomings related to this criticism, because it provides evidence that 
social and economic by-products are playing a role in creating power. The US saw its 
soft power increase in China due to the transformation of the Big Mac into a status 
symbol among middle-class Chinese.37 Chinese will often spend as much as a 
fortnight’s income for one, due to its perception as being “chic”.38 This example 
highlights the role played by society and the economy in developing soft power in 
other states. This is because the economic power of McDonalds as a global brand saw 
it spread to China, and its status saw it become a source of attraction among Chinese. 
 The conclusions made by Nye, that the importance of soft power is increasing, 
certain variables determine its success or failure, and that it is created by social and 
economic by-products rather than direct government action, have been shown to 
have made significant contributions to the academic debate, because they have 
identified areas of research previously unexamined, have identified benefits 
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previously disregarded, and shown that direct action is not necessary to generate 
power. 
 
The impact of alternative schools of thought on soft power 
 
 The theoretical framework behind Nye’s theory has been influenced by a 
number of other important theories in the field of international relations. These 
theories are closely related to soft power, in the explanations they provide for how 
the international system works, and for the role that actors play in the system. These 
explanations are important, because they provide important insights into the role of 
it within the international system. To better appreciate this, the alternative theories 
will be examined, to show how they improve understanding. Following this, the main 
criticisms will be reviewed, to highlight the shortcomings of this concept, and why 
they are important to the academic debate. 
 
Alternative theories 
 
 There are a number of theoretical frameworks in the field of international 
relations that contribute to the understanding of soft power. These theories are 
important, because they explain several aspects of it that are at odds with more 
traditional aspects of power. To better appreciate this, the section will review the 
academic literature on constructivism, complex interdependence theory, and the 
nature of power in global governance. The purpose of this section is to examine how 
these theories provide explanations for the role that soft power plays within the 
international system and why they matter. 
 
 Constructivism, complex interdependence theory, and the role of power all 
provide differing explanations for the existence and role of soft power in the 
international system. All these explanations are significant for the academic literature, 
because they enhance the understanding of the concept, and make it possible for 
greater scholarship in areas that have not previously been understood. 
Constructivist theory is important to the academic debate, because it provides 
an explanation for its existence in the international system. Constructivism argues 
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that concepts in the international system, such as power, are socially constructed by 
actors within the system, rather than simply existing as part of nature.39 
Constructivist scholar Wendt argues in his seminal work, Social Theory of 
International Politics, that the role of society in shaping the identities of individuals 
and the role of domestic politics in foreign policy suggests that the neo-realist belief 
in structure influencing states’ behaviour is not necessarily the correct assumption.40 
This idea is important to the concept of soft power, because it provides an 
explanation for its existence. The role of states, NGOs and individuals in generating 
power is explained by constructivism’s belief in social construction of ideas and 
concepts in the international system. This suggests that soft power’s reliance on 
culture, norms and values, and policies are derived from the socially constructed 
nature of the international system. This important, because it suggests that it is a 
result of the socially constructed nature of the international system. 
 Keohane and Nye established the idea of complex interdependence as a 
response to the increasing interconnectedness of the international system. This 
theory of complex interdependence is important for the understanding of soft power, 
because it provides greater understanding of its role. Keohane and Nye argue that 
states and their fortunes are inextricably tied together due to the growing economic 
and political ties that exist between them.41 This interconnectedness has resulted in 
states becoming reliant on each other in a number of areas. Keohane and Nye state 
that this has both positive and negative outcomes for states. The oil shocks of the 
1970s had a negative impact on Western states such as the US, Japan, and Western 
Europe, as OPEC member states initiated an oil embargo.42 Complex interdependence 
is important, because it provides insight into the role that attraction plays. As states 
become more interconnected, the role that image and reputation play becomes more 
significant. This has led to states becoming more focused on ensuring that they 
maintain a positive image on the world stage. Soft power has emerged from this, 
becoming a major factor in the nature of state-to-state relations, especially when 
influencing the attitudes and opinions of citizens. This shows that complex 
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interdependence is important to the academic debate, because it explains how the 
nature of the international system has enabled soft power to assume an important 
role in the foreign policy arsenal of states. 
 Power is seen as a crucial aspect of international relations, especially among 
realist scholars. The dominance of realism in the scholarly field of international 
relations has led to a focus on power as a tool used, and sought, by states to wield 
over other states. But it is more important than this; it influences the very system that 
states exist within. It has the ability to shape state behaviour, which is a powerful tool 
in international relations. This debate has been brought to light by Barnett and Duvall, 
who argue that the many different forms of power must be understood, to better 
understand how outcomes are reached and how states are enabled or constrained in 
their actions.43 It is argued that by doing this, the understanding of global governance 
can be reshaped. Barnett and Duvall identify four main types of power; compulsory, 
institutional, structural, and productive power.44 This is important for the debate 
because soft power can be attributed most closely to a form of productive power, due 
to its role in shaping the subjectivities of citizens in other states. It is an important 
type of power than has not been adequately examined, despite its important role in 
providing new understanding of global governance. Barnett and Duvall’s work is 
important, because it identifies the complex nature of power, and provides a counter-
argument to the dominance of realism. It also identifies the role that aspects of soft 
power have in shaping global governance. 
These theories have been shown to contribute to the academic debate, 
whether in terms of the role that soft power plays in the international system, or why 
it came to exist. This is important for the later examination of Chinese soft power, 
because it provides greater insight into how it is used and adapted by states as part of 
their foreign policy 
 
 Criticisms of soft power 
 
 Soft power has attracted criticism from a number of international relations 
scholars, most prominently from the realist school of thought. These criticisms are 
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important to the academic debate, because they identify areas where it is in 
competition with other theories, and it identifies potential weaknesses in the 
theoretical framework. To better appreciate these criticisms, the section will first 
look at what the criticisms made by neo-realist, offensive realist, and structuralist 
scholars are. Then it will explain why they are important to the academic field. 
 
 Neo-realist scholars criticise soft power for several reasons. The main reason 
it is criticised is because neo-realists posit that actors are only responsible for two 
types of incentive; economic incentive or force. This is argued by Waltz in Man, the 
State, and War, and Theory of International Politics. In these works, Waltz argues that 
economic incentives and force are used by states to ensure their own survival. Neo-
realism states that force is necessary to ensure the balance of power between states, 
and to ensure their survival in an anarchic system. Waltz states that because of this, 
economic incentives and military force are effective tools for maintaining and 
developing power.45 Because of this emphasis on hard power tools, neo-realist 
scholars criticise soft power for being ineffective and vague, and a reflection of hard 
power. Waltz emphasises this when he uses the example of Russian exposure to 
British civilisation. He uses this example to explain that British use of military force 
was responsible for the widespread cultural change in Russian society.46 This 
example is important, because it highlights criticism by neo-realists that soft power is 
actually a reflection of hard power. 
 Offensive realism was established as a major school of realist thought in the 
early twenty-first century. It differs from neo-realism in that it holds that states strive 
to become hegemons, by pursuing aggressive policies to maximise their power.47 This 
differs from defensive realism in that it holds that states seek defensive policies 
aimed at ensuring their own survival, or maintaining the status quo.48 Mearsheimer 
argues that states can never been certain of the intentions of others, and possess 
offensive military capability to maximise their power. This argument put forward 
backs up his criticism of soft power, that international institutions are incapable of 
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convincing states to stop acting as short-term power maximisers.49 He goes on to 
argue that institutions merely reflect the current balance of power in the 
international system.50 These two statements underpin the offensive realist critique, 
because soft power theory relies heavily on international institutions to generate and 
transmit power. Mearsheimer’s argument that institutions merely reflect the balance 
of power is important, because it discredits the idea that international institutions 
can generate soft power for other states. 
 Structure is an important aspect of realism, because some realist scholars 
argue that structure is a constraint on state behaviour. Structure has been used as a 
criticism of soft power by international relations scholars, as it is argued that soft 
power currencies are merely embedded within the established structure of the 
international system. Niall Ferguson pushes this criticism, arguing that currencies 
like culture, values and norms are merely part of the existing structure of the 
international system. To highlight this argument, Ferguson uses the British and 
American empires as examples. He argues that the use of media, sport, literature and 
other cultural tools by the US to develop soft power is merely a continuation of the 
British Empire’s use of the same tools to develop the same attraction.51 He goes on to 
argue that it is merely a continuation of the “Anglicisation” policies that dominate the 
international system.52 This argument underpins Ferguson’s critique, because it 
provides evidence that soft power currencies may simply be aspects of the 
established structure of the international system, rather than tools to be used by 
states to develop soft power. 
 
 The critiques put forward by various realist scholars have contributed to the 
academic debate in many important ways. The claims of vagueness and 
ineffectiveness, the lack of trust among states, and the structure of the international 
system have asked questions of the theoretical framework that require examination 
to better understand the intellectual framework of soft power. 
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 Claims made by critics that it is a vague and ineffective concept are important, 
because they underline a major weakness in the theoretical framework. This 
weakness concerns the lack of solid tests to measure the extent of soft power, and the 
effectiveness of it. This is an important issue, because it highlights the problems it 
faces in competing with rival forms of power for legitimacy. Hard power’s obvious 
visibility and ability to be measured means that it possesses more legitimacy. Soft 
power’s reliance on opinion polls as a primary measure of effectiveness has been 
dismissed by scholars such as Ferguson, making it subject to greater criticism.53 Its 
effectiveness has also been criticised, which is important because it asks questions of 
its success rate. This is due to some notable failures to influence outcomes desired by 
superpower states. The US is promoted by soft power scholars as an example of a 
state that wields a great deal of power in other countries, especially among its allies. 
Despite this, it was unable to obtain the votes of Mexico or Chile in the UN Security 
Council for its 2003 invasion of Iraq.54 This is important, because it shows that soft 
power has not yet demonstrated that it is able to consistently translate efforts into 
results, which is necessary to improve its legitimacy among states. 
 The critique by scholars rests on the belief that states cannot trust each other, 
which makes it impossible for international institutions to be used to develop soft 
power. This critique is important to the field, because international institutions are a 
central aspect of the theoretical framework. This criticism is significant, because 
proponents argue that these institutions play an important role in developing and 
projecting soft power. If international institutions merely reflect the dominant state 
in the international system, then it casts doubt on the ability of rising states to use 
these institutions to develop their own power. This criticism offered by scholars 
raises a question; if institutions are controlled by dominant states, are they 
developing soft power, or are they merely reflecting the polarity of the international 
system? This is important, because it places into question the effect that international 
institutions actually have, as claimed by proponents of the theory. This critique has 
made an important contribution to the academic debate, because it identifies a 
serious shortcoming in the theoretical framework. 
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 Realist critics have argued that the currencies identified by Nye as being 
necessary are simply aspects of the existing structure of the international system, not 
tools for developing soft power. This critique is important, because it discredits the 
main features of the concept. The claim that culture, values and norms, and policies 
are simply parts of the existing structure of the international system suggests that 
soft power is not an independent entity, but a by-product of the international system 
itself. This is important, because it challenges the idea put forward by Nye that 
culture, values, norms and policies can be used by states to generate power. 
 
 The alternative theories that reinforce the theoretical framework, and the 
critiques offered by realist scholars, are important contributions to the academic 
debate. Constructivism, complex interdependence theory, and the debate 
surrounding power have all been highlighted as making significant contributions to 
the understanding of soft power, either by providing greater insight into the role that 
it plays, or why it exists. The critiques examined have highlighted important 
shortcomings that exist in the theoretical framework. These critiques should be 
addressed by the academic literature, to enhance its legitimacy and to expand 
understanding of the theory.  
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Chinese soft power: a framework for a harmonious world 
 
 The aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre saw China reconsider how 
it approaches its governance, with a view to improving its image among other states. 
As part of this, China has sought to make use of certain aspects of soft power, altering 
and adapting them to suit its needs. This has seen several tools of soft power be 
transformed by the Chinese regime, adopting Chinese characteristics to them.55 China 
believes that its soft power is different from Nye’s definition, because it features its 
own characteristics and is embedded in Chinese traditional culture and ideology.56 
This reinterpretation is due to the widely held belief among Chinese policymakers 
that it has always been an indispensible part of its comprehensive national strength. 
Comprehensive national strength is a uniquely Chinese concept that is not evident in 
the West.57 It encompasses several facets of society to calculate a state’s strength. 
These facets include politics, economy, military, culture, values and other factors.58 
China has interpreted soft power in this way because it seeks to become a global 
power, and to ensure the success of socialism over capitalism.59 To do this it realises 
that it must formulate a positive image among other states. This section will examine 
the academic literature regarding China’s interpretation of soft power and its use 
within the international system. The nature of Chinese soft power will be examined 
to provide an overview of the subject area. The literature will then be reviewed to 
provide greater understanding of the subject. 
 
Overview 
 
 China has only recently been exposed to the great international relations 
debate. Since the opening up of China in the 1970s, Chinese elites were quickly 
exposed to the new concept of soft power. It has been adopted by the Chinese 
government as a way to create a favourable image for itself, and to reassure other 
states that its rise is peaceful. To properly analyse the literature on Chinese soft 
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power, the overall arguments must be explained. To accomplish this, the explanation 
will be split into three thematic sections relating to the theory and Chinese policy: 
China’s domestic values and politics, China’s culture, and its foreign relations. 
 Top-down soft power is heavily influenced by the domestic values and politics 
of states who are wielding it. The literature says that this has had a significant impact 
on China’s efforts at enhancing its soft power, both positively and negatively. It has 
identified that Chinese domestic values have had a positive effect. China’s model of 
economic development, often referred to as the “Beijing Consensus”, is identified as a 
major source of soft power for China. This is because of the success it has had, which 
can be attributed to the process of controlled decentralisation and gradual 
liberalisation.60 The field argues that this has created soft power because developing 
states are attracted to this model of economic modernisation. Russian President 
Vladimir Putin and Indian leader Manmohan Singh have both complimented the 
Chinese model and suggested it be used in parts of their economies.61 This attraction 
can also be attributed, in part, to the growing backlash against the failed neoliberal 
model forced by the West on developing states. It also highlights China’s 
improvements in social policy as a contributing factor to China’s soft power.62 Gill and 
Huang state that it can be seen in the results of opinion polls conducted within the 
Asian region. They cite BBC surveys which show China’s reputation on the increase in 
neighbouring states and in Southeast Asia, as the US’s reputation declines.63 China’s 
domestic politics can also be identified as having harmed its soft power, due to the 
lack of democracy and human rights abuses committed by the state. The literature 
goes on to explain that China’s gains are being undermined by its lack of concern for 
democracy or human rights, which Nye says play a crucial role in influencing how 
others perceive a state. It argues that China’s refusal to consider democratic reforms 
or human rights improvements has resulted in China being viewed negatively by 
outsiders, which has proved harmful.64 Gill and Huang argue that the authoritarian 
political system, rampant corruption, and lack of human rights consciousness all pose 
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serious obstacles to China’s soft power.65 China’s more aggressive regional security 
policies post-2009 has also posed obstacles, due to the threatening nature of their 
actions. 
 Culture has become an integral part of China’s soft power, as it seeks to 
improve its image on the world stage. Prior to its opening up, China did not focus its 
efforts on improving its international image. The need to modernise the Chinese 
economy saw greater attention placed on ensuring that China was viewed positively 
by the outside world. This need for China to be viewed positively by the outside 
world led to a debate around the need for a “peaceful rise”. It is argued that China has 
placed an emphasis on its culture as a way to educate the outside world about its rise 
and to allay concerns of neighbours and other states about its rise to a global power. 
China has sought to focus on a number of areas where Chinese culture has historically 
been strong. These include education, tourism, and the Chinese language. Education 
has proved increasingly successful at improving China’s image globally, and its soft 
power resources within the international system. One such way that China has 
spread its influence across the globe is through the establishment of Confucius 
Institutes, and through educational exchanges both to and from China. Confucius 
Institutes have been established to educate others about China and its culture. Ding 
states that the objective of the institutes is to strengthen the “understanding, 
opportunities and bonds between individuals, enterprises, communities and 
institutions”, in their home country with the Peoples’ Republic of China.66 The author 
argues that this is significant because Chinese culture has become popular again, 
which has resulted in an increased desire to take advantage of the demand for access 
to Chinese education.67 The second way that China has used education to increase its 
soft power is through educational exchanges to its country. China has become an 
increasingly attractive destination for students wanting to study at university, 
especially in the fields of business and science. The attractiveness of China’s culture 
and its burgeoning economy is attracting foreign students to its tertiary institutions 
over those in other states.68 The enrolment of foreign students in China saw a 
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tremendous increase between 1995 and 2004, rising from 36,855 to 110,844.69 The 
authors argue that the significance of this lies in the comparison with education 
exchanges in the US. The authors state that at the same time that Chinese educational 
power has been increasing, the educational attractiveness of the US has been 
decreasing.  During the 2003/04 academic year foreign enrolments in the US 
decreased by 2.4 percent, the first drop in three decades.70 China has also used 
tourism to boost its cultural attractiveness. Tourism to and from China has increased 
the understanding of China and Chinese peoples’ understanding of other parts of the 
world. This has contributed to China’s soft power because it portrays a wealthier, 
more confident class of Chinese citizen.71 This in turn influences tourists to visit 
China, due to the attractiveness of its culture and history. China’s status as a major 
cultural centre of Asia is in large part the reason for China’s attractiveness as a tourist 
destination.72 Ding and Saunders state that between 1980 and 2004 China saw the 
total number of in-bound non-Chinese tourists increase nineteen-fold.73 The 
examples used reinforce the argument they put forward, because they show that 
culture has become an integral part of Chinese foreign policy, because it portrays a 
positive image of China and allays fears about its rise that may be held by outsiders. 
 Foreign policy plays a significant role in soft power, due to its role as the voice 
of states within the international system.  This means that the foreign policies 
adopted by states can either harm or improve their international standing. China has 
used its foreign policy to generate a positive image of itself, particularly in regions of 
the world that have been ignored by the West. The authors identify three major 
themes that dictate China’s foreign policy initiatives; these are chequebook 
diplomacy, visit diplomacy and participation in international organisations. These 
three themes are particularly focused on the hard power aspects of Chinese foreign 
policy, particularly the role of chequebook diplomacy. China has placed particular 
focus on its use of “chequebook diplomacy”. Chequebook diplomacy is the foreign 
policy practice of using financial aid or economic development to gain diplomatic 
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favour from smaller states. Kurtlantzick argues that China uses chequebook 
diplomacy to portray itself as an alternative force to the likes of the US. This is 
primarily due to China’s willingness to act as a silent partner in the affairs of the 
states it provides aid to. The primary argument is that China provides aid to states 
that officially recognise it with little to no conditions, and without concern in regards 
to the domestic politics of recipient states.74 The literature argues that China’s 
decision to treat the states it provides aid to as equal partners has enhanced its soft 
power.75 This is because China respects their sovereignty and independence, which 
differentiates China from Western powers, who attach good governance conditions to 
their aid.76 This attitude by China has attracted many developing states because of 
the more equal treatment that they receive from China, compared with the neo-
Westphalian Western foreign policy. The literature goes on to explain that this can be 
attributed to China’s emphasis of its shared history of colonial oppression with states 
like those in Africa.77 This has proven an advantage to China in enhancing its soft 
power in regions like Africa, due to its ability to find common ground at the expense 
of the West. The author does however also highlight the negative impact that Chinese 
foreign policy has had on its soft power. Liang explains that China provides 
development assistance to African states like Zimbabwe and Sudan, despite human 
rights violations and a lack of democracy.78 This willingness to ignore the domestic 
politics of the states it is courting has potentially harmed its soft power, because it 
has brought about negative publicity towards its attempts to develop an image of 
China as a responsible world power.79 China has continually foiled the West’s 
attempts to force sanctions on Sudan over its human rights abuses, as it supplies 
almost five percent of China’s oil.80 This stance taken by China has caused Western 
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media to negatively portray the country.81 This has been shown to have significant 
negative impact upon China’s quest for a better understanding of its objectives and 
its international standing. 
 The academic literature on Chinese soft power has identified its relevance to 
the debate surrounding soft power. The focus on the three areas of domestic values 
and politics, culture, and foreign policy have been important for the literature 
because it has allowed the arguments to be separated to provide a clear debate on its 
benefits and costs to China. 
 
Review 
 
 The academic literature has significantly covered China’s use of soft power, as 
part of its rise to great power status. This section seeks to review this, to examine the 
arguments made and their significance, and to analyse and interpret the conclusions 
and findings made. To do this, the first section will focus on the arguments made, 
followed by a second section focussing on the conclusions and findings reached. 
 The previous section highlighted the main arguments of the academic 
literature concerning the three major parts of China’s soft power policy. The 
argument made towards China’s domestic values and policies says that China’s 
development model has drawn favour from many developing states, due to its lack of 
conditions put on assistance, but that this is also being harmed by China’s lack of 
progress towards democracy and human rights domestically. The first part of the 
argument, that China has enhanced its soft power through the development model 
that it adopted to grow its economy and its attitude to aid distribution, has proven to 
be very convincing. This is because the author bases the argument on large amounts 
of evidence from a cross-section of the international system. The wide use of 
evidence has enhanced the argument because it shows that China’s image is 
enhanced across the globe, rather than confined to a specific area. This is shown by 
the evidence provided from Africa and Latin America. Sautman and Hairong explore 
the decision by African states to turn to China’s development model as an alternative 
to the Washington consensus, which they explain is due to the conditions attached to 
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Western development assistance.82 This trend is also evident in Latin America, as 
Ding argues that Latin American countries are attracted to the Chinese development 
model, in part by the prevalence of left-leaning political parties, but also due to the 
attractiveness of China’s model.83 The links made between examples from different 
regions highlight the convincingness of the argument that China’s development 
model has enhanced its soft power, because China’s growing support can be found in 
different parts of the world. This wealth of evidence provided to back up this 
argument can also be seen in the argument that China’s provision of development 
assistance has also enhanced its soft power, due to the lack of conditions and 
requirements attached to this aid. This is due to the wealth of statistics provided that 
shows the importance of Chinese aid to its power in the international system. Guttal 
uses statistics related to China’s aid and development assistance distribution to show 
that China is gaining considerable support from its provision of “no-strings-attached” 
aid. This can be seen in the comparison of China’s aid programmes in Asia and Africa. 
Guttal explains that China provides large amounts of aid to the Asian Development 
Fund and Africa Development Bank for aid projects in the region.84 This comparison 
is important because it shows that there is significant evidence supporting the 
arguments made by the authors. 
The argument made that the soft power gains made by China’s development 
model are being harmed by its domestic politics has made a significant contribution 
to the academic debate. This is because the role that domestic politics play compared 
to domestic values is a significant aspect of soft power, but there has been little 
comparison of the effect that the two have on each other. The analysis highlights the 
problems facing China’s domestic politics, largely due to the lack of action towards 
democracy and human rights, which it argues is harming China’s image. This is 
significant, because the harm being caused by China’s domestic politics is directly 
affecting the gains made by its domestic values, such as its development model. Gill 
and Haung argue that the soft power gains being made by China are being 
undermined by its political system, human rights record and growing economic and 
military power.85 This example highlights the importance of the comparison made by 
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the literature. This is because it shows the problems posed when states have 
attractive domestic values, like China’s development model, but its domestic politics 
are not viewed positively by other states within the international system. 
 The academic literature has developed the argument that China has used its 
culture to improve the image it projects to outsiders. The argument is objectively 
reasoned and has been supported by considerable statistical evidence. The 
objectivity of this argument can be attributed to the type of evidence used to support 
it. This is because the evidence used allows the authors to take a step back and let the 
statistics guide the argument. This can be seen in the way that the statistics are used 
in the arguments put forward. The statistical evidence shows both positive effects of 
Chinese culture and negative effects, both of which are highlighted and examined. 
The literature uses statistics showing the numbers of people coming to China to study 
and for tourism to highlight the power of China’s culture in enhancing its soft 
power.86 These statistics suggest that China has benefited from the attractiveness of 
its culture in the form of increasing tourist and student numbers. It also identifies a 
growing fear of China’s rise that is not being allayed by China’s culture. Holyk 
identifies a growing fear held by East Asian countries towards China’s rise. He states 
that seventy-four percent of Japanese and South Korean citizens surveyed, identified 
themselves as “very worried” or “somewhat worried” that China will become a 
military threat.87 These two examples highlight the importance of statistics in 
ensuring the objectivity of the argument put forward, because it has highlighted the 
traditional concerns of rising powers. 
 The argument put forward that China is using its foreign policy to project a 
positive image is not convincing. China’s relationships with dictators and human 
rights abusers undermine the argument made by the authors.  The literature has 
argued that China’s foreign policy has focused on reaching out to other states, and 
embracing multilateralism, which it is argued is a ploy to dispel concerns over its 
intentions. This argument is supported by evidence, like China’s decision to reform 
much of its legal and economic institutions so it could join the WTO.88 The authors 
use this argument to highlight the way that this has enhanced China’s soft power. 
Despite this, evidence is identified that contradicts the argument that China’s foreign 
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policy is enhancing its soft power. China’s willingness to cooperate with 
undemocratic regimes is harming its standing in the international system. Gill and 
Huang argue that China’s friendship with dictatorships has created a legitimacy 
problem, which threatens its soft power status.89 Gains made by China through can be 
eroded when it supports dictators who oppress its peoples, in countries it is 
attempting to attract. The examples highlighted here show the significant 
contradiction in arguments made in regards to China’s foreign policy, which has 
challenged the convincingness of the argument used in the literature. 
 
   The conclusions reached regarding Chinese soft power is in need of analysis, 
as it provides an important insight into the wider field and its applications to other 
parts of the world. To this end, this section will focus on the three major conclusions 
reached by the authors. The three conclusions made are that; China has made large 
gains in its soft power, further development will be constrained by domestic factors, 
and that China’s soft power is reliant on other states within the international system. 
These conclusions will be analysed and reviewed to identify their contributions. 
 The academic literature concludes that China has made significant gains in its 
soft power over the last two decades. This conclusion is significant, because of the 
implications it has for future analysis. This is because the argument that China has 
made significant gains shows that soft power analysis can be applied to other non-
democratic regimes. It is concluded that China’s use of a combination of culture and 
domestic values has enabled it to develop a positive image on the world stage, by 
using its culture to educate outsiders and its domestic values to attract them. The 
literature concludes that this combination has proven very successful for China, due 
to the increase in its soft power. It also provides an insight into the application of soft 
power analysis to non-democratic regimes, because of the challenge that China faces 
in enhancing its soft power while restricting access to democracy and human rights. 
The relationship between China’s domestic values and its domestic politics provides 
an important comparison because it shows that despite conflict between politics and 
values, soft power can still be developed. This provides opportunities for it in other 
states to be examined, because of the relationship between culture and domestic 
values. This is significant because it allows the international system to be examined 
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from a different perspective. Ding concludes that China’s use of soft power has 
allowed it to reposition its geopolitical alliances in a way that aids its ascent as a great 
power, due to its new diplomatic approaches that have brought it favour among 
states that have traditionally been wary of its rise, such as South Korea.90 This 
example highlights how soft power is changing the way that states form alliances and 
grow their power. Because of this, the conclusion made that China has experienced 
significant gains shows the potential for soft power to be used as an alternative form 
of analysis of the international system. 
 The second conclusion made is important because it suggests that soft power 
leads to democratisation. This is because it concludes that China’s future prospects 
are constrained by factors like its authoritarian political system. It concludes that 
China’s authoritarian system is not widely attractive, nor is its legal system, which 
will constrain China’s ability to compete with established powers such as the US.91 
The nature of the Chinese state and its legal system is severely damaging the top-
down nature of China’s soft power development. This conclusion suggests that any 
gains may not be enhanced without a reciprocal gain in democratisation. This is 
significant because it suggests that China’s focus on soft power will not be effective in 
the future unless it democratises to some degree. Ding and Saunders argue that 
unless China modernises its political system to adopt more democratic aspects it will 
only be attractive to countries in corners of the world where respect for democracy 
and human rights is not valued.92 It also states in its conclusions that China cannot 
compete with the other great power, the US, without some level of democratisation, 
because the US is perceived very positively in its attitude towards democracy and 
human rights.93 This example highlights the significance of the conclusion reached in 
regards to China’s continued soft power development, because China cannot attract a 
wider audience of states unless it is viewed positively by states that value democracy 
and human rights, which constrains the effectiveness of the soft power it is 
attempting to develop. 
 The third conclusion reached is that China’s continued rise will largely be 
determined by the role it takes internationally. The literature concludes that the fate 
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of China’s soft power rests on whether or not it chooses to continue with its 
increasingly cooperative stance on the international stage.94 China’s integration into 
international governance has been identified as a significant factor in its increasing 
soft power. It suggests that unless China continues to become more integrated into 
international organisations it will risk harming its soft power. This is significant, 
because it highlights the relationship between soft power and cooperation in 
international organisations. Ding argues that China has become more involved in 
international organisations such as ASEAN and the WTO to counter the perception 
that a rising China is a threat.95 Ding goes on to conclude that this has proved a 
significant aspect of China’s drive to create a “harmonious world” conducive to its 
rise.96 This is an important contribution to the academic field because it shows the 
relationship between international cooperation and soft power is important to 
enhance the perception of a state in the international system. 
 The conclusions reached are significant to the academic field surrounding 
China’s use of soft power. This has been shown through the examination of three 
conclusions. These are; China’s soft power gains, the impact of domestic factors on 
future soft power development, and the reliance of China’s soft power on the 
international system. These three conclusions have all highlighted the significance of 
China’s use of soft power and the implications it has on future development. 
 
China in the South Pacific: new kid on the block 
 
China’s relationship with the South Pacific is a relatively recent addition to the 
academic field. This is due in large part to the diplomatic rivalry between China and 
Taiwan, which was played out between the two countries in the South Pacific for 
almost two decades. This rivalry saw China provide large amounts of no-strings-
attached financial aid to the region, and vast infrastructure projects. However, since 
their diplomatic truce in 2008 China has expanded its relations in the region. This 
expansion has included a growing focus on soft power initiatives by China. The South 
Pacific will provide a useful case study for China’s increasing adoption of soft power 
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initiatives, because it is not a very widely understood area of China’s foreign relations. 
The scholarship on China-South Pacific relations is limited, and that scholarship that 
does exist is largely focused on its prominent relationships, such as with Fiji. 
 
Overview 
 
 The academic literature on China’s engagement with the South Pacific has 
focused on three key themes. These three themes relate to China’s objectives in the 
region, and are considered important to the analysis of the literature. The three 
themes are; China’s aid provision to the region, natural resources, and diplomatic 
rivalry with Taiwan. 
 
The academic literature on the theme of Chinese aid provision in the South 
Pacific focuses its analysis on the harm that this aid is causing to the region. It has 
identified that aid provision has become a significant topic in the South Pacific, due to 
the sensitive nature of its provision and the problems caused by it, such as issues 
around dependence. It goes further, arguing that the lack of requirements and 
conditions attached to aid provided by China has resulted in problems around 
corruption, instability and lack of coordination. It is argued that Chinese aid has 
encouraged corruption in South Pacific states, because the lack of oversight of 
Chinese aid means that Pacific elites are free to use the aid money freely. Saunders 
states in Chinese Foreign Policy in Asia that China does not impose anti-corruption 
conditions on its financial aid, as part of its longstanding policy of diplomatic rivalry 
with Taiwan.97 Dobell goes further, arguing that Chinese aid contributed as part of its 
rivalry with Taiwan has done considerable harm to the region, by making South 
Pacific politics “more corrupt and more violent”.98 The work on China’s engagement 
with the South Pacific also attributes an increase in instability within the region to 
the lack of conditions attached to Chinese financial aid. The move by South Pacific 
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states towards China for foreign aid can be attributed to growing frustration at the 
“big brother” policies of NZ and Australia. It has also been suggested that these states 
may be playing these traditional powers off against the relative newcomer, China. 
This has caused South Pacific states to accept larger amounts of financial aid, 
regardless of their economic situation. This has led to financial instability in several 
South Pacific states as they struggle to repay the soft loans provided by China. 
Hanson says that South Pacific states may be accepting soft loans from China despite 
concerning financial outlooks because they believe that China will write off the debt if 
requested to.99 This theme is expanded on further by Hanson, who focuses on the 
problem of financial instability by explaining that a key condition China does attach 
to its aid is the requirement that Chinese companies, labour and materials be used for 
construction of any projects funded by China.100 
The secrecy that China attaches to its aid payments has been identified as a 
major problem to emerge from China’s increasing engagement with the region. 
Because China regards its aid payments as a state secret, it refuses to release details 
of payments to fellow donor states in the region, and routinely refuses to cooperate 
with other donor states.101 This has resulted in problems around aid duplication as 
other donors in the region are unaware of what aid China is providing, and to 
whom.102 The academic literature on Chinese engagement with the South Pacific has 
focused on a major theme of problems caused by China’s aid contribution to the 
region, which can be seen in the secretive nature of aid distribution, corruption 
caused by this, and the lack of coordination of this aid. 
 
Another major theme covered by the academic literature on Chinese 
engagement with the South Pacific is the quest for natural resources. China’s quest 
for greater access to natural resources is covered in great detail, which looks at it as 
one of China’s motivations for greater engagement with the region. The South Pacific 
is rich in key resources, such as fish stocks, natural gas, minerals, timber and oil, but 
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these resources are expensive to obtain.103 This, it is argued, has fuelled greater 
Chinese engagement with the region, as it seeks to gain access to these resources 
which are crucial to its modernisation process. It is stated that China has focused its 
initial engagement with the region, largely involving aid, around improving the 
region’s facilities for accessing these natural resources.104 Hanson explains that China 
has funded projects such as the construction of fish processing plants in Vanuatu, the 
Cook Islands and PNG, along with a headquarters building for the Tuna Management 
Commission in Micronesia.105 The author identifies this as a continuing trend, with 
China seeking to ensure it has access to the natural resources that exist in the region. 
Shie argues that China has been heavily involved in developing the South Pacific’s 
natural resource stocks so it can have access to them.106 The theme of natural 
resource access in the literature suggests that it is a significant motivation for 
Chinese engagement in the region. The focus on natural resources is important, 
because it highlights a significant aspect of China’s engagement with the region. 
Despite this, economic goods may not necessarily be Beijing’s primary motivation for 
this engagement. 
 
 The third key theme on Chinese engagement with the South Pacific is the role 
that China’s diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan plays. The literature identifies China’s 
rivalry with Taiwan as a destabilising factor in the region, as the two fight for official 
recognition within the UN. They cite several reasons for the destabilisation caused by 
this rivalry. The main reason for destabilisation caused by the diplomatic rivalry is 
the quest by China to seek to attract island states to officially recognise it as the one 
official China. This is because Taiwan needs diplomatic recognition to ensure it has a 
voice within international organisations such as the UN.107 This rivalry has caused 
China to pursue potentially harmful methods of gaining official recognition. Despite 
the insistence by China that its methods are not causing harm, one of these harmful 
methods is the use of financial aid without conditions attached, which has caused 
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instability through debt and corruption. Another effect of the rivalry contributing to 
destabilisation in the region is the link between this rivalry and conflict in the region. 
The diplomatic rivalry between China and Taiwan has contributed to fuelling existing 
conflicts in some South Pacific countries.108 Anti-Chinese riots have occurred across 
the South Pacific in places such as Nuku’alofa and the Solomon Islands.109 China and 
Taiwan’s willingness to provide aid to these countries has led to incidents of 
politicians defrauding their country by corruptly funnelling Chinese aid money for 
their personal use. These conflicts are explored by the literature due to the 
relationship between China’s increasing engagement with the region and the reasons 
for the conflict. The Chinatown riots in Nuku’alofa were caused by anger towards 
Chinese migrants, but the literature also argues that there is anger caused by a 
perceived lack of action by China towards the consequences of illegal migration by 
Chinese into the region, and local economic friction between Tongan and Chinese 
business people.110 The literature has highlighted the negative consequences of 
China’s diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan in the South Pacific, especially between native 
communities and the immigrant Chinese population. 
 
As highlighted in this overview, the literature on China’s engagement with the 
South Pacific has had both positive and negative consequences within the region. As 
shown, the region has greatly benefitted from access to financial assistance, 
assistance to develop natural resources and improved infrastructure. But below the 
surface, a growing concern over the negative consequences of China’s short-term 
thinking towards achieving its goals in the region has been identified, which has been 
highlighted by the corruption and lack of coordination of Chinese aid, the lack of 
benefits brought by Chinese infrastructure projects and the destabilisation caused by 
China’s policies in the region. 
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Review 
 
 To fully understand the existing literature on China’s engagement with the 
South Pacific, it must be analysed and interpreted to establish the context of the 
academic analysis to be covered. As highlighted earlier, the main arguments on 
China’s engagement with the South Pacific focus on aid, natural resources and the 
diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan. To properly analyse the arguments, they must be 
looked at individually, to enable them to be thoroughly analysed. 
 The main argument on Chinese aid in the South Pacific is that the lack of 
“strings” attached to this aid has created problems for island states who accept aid 
from China. The aim of the literature has been to highlight these problems, and the 
associated costs caused by them. This argument is significant because it highlights 
the dangers posed by China’s current approach to currying favour in the South Pacific. 
This is because China’s policy of providing financial aid to the South Pacific has led to 
countries becoming heavily indebted. This claim is important, because an increasing 
number of media sources in the region are reporting on the financial burden being 
placed on island states due to these programmes, in a time of economic upheaval. The 
Tongan government has accepted soft loans from China worth up to twenty-two 
percent of its GDP, raising concerns about how it will repay these loans.111 This 
example strengthens the argument put forward because it provides statistical 
evidence of the negative consequences of Chinese engagement with the region. The 
overall argument put forward by academics, such as Fergus Hanson, that Chinese 
engagement in the South Pacific has harmed the region is strong, because it uses 
several different cases as evidence of the consequences of Chinese engagement. In 
addition to the financial instability highlighted earlier, the academic literature also 
focuses on the lack of coordination in aid dispersion and the short-term nature of 
infrastructure projects.  It also argues that China’s refusal to disclose its aid figures 
has harmed island states by preventing donors from being able to coordinate aid 
distribution. China only attends donor meetings in one Pacific Island country – 
Tonga.112 This argument is significant, because it provides an important contribution 
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by highlighting the harm that China’s official aid policy is causing, and its effects on 
the ground in the South Pacific.  
The second case that has strengthened the argument made by Hanson and 
others is the problems associated with a short-term focus by China in regards to 
infrastructure projects. The literature argues that as part of its efforts to counter 
Taiwan in the South Pacific, China has focused on providing infrastructural aid, often 
in the form of “prestige” buildings, such as stadiums to island states in the region, 
while traditional powers are more focused on providing education, training and 
human resources aid. Hanson provides the example of the swimming complex 
provided by China to Samoa, which officials have said is so expensive to maintain that 
even New Zealand would struggle to cover the costs.113 This has significantly 
contributed to the argument put forward by critics of China’s financial support, 
because it highlights a major problem caused by the short term nature of China’s aid 
provision. This problem has been shown to have negatively affected the region. The 
argument made by critics in some studies of China’s provision of aid in the South 
Pacific has highlighted the negative consequences for the region, which is important 
to the academic field. This can be seen in the way that authors such as Hanson have 
used soft loans, aid secrecy and the short-term focus of Chinese aid to highlight 
problems caused by China in the region. 
 
 The conclusions reached and findings made are important for the 
understanding of the academic debate on Chinese engagement with the South Pacific, 
so they must also be examined to further highlight the significance to the academic 
debate. Three main conclusions put forward will be analysed in greater depth to 
highlight the gap in research on China’s use of soft power to compensate for its 
current policies towards the region. 
The first conclusion that requires analysis was put forward by Fergus Hanson 
in his article, China: Stumbling through the Pacific? In it he concludes that despite 
some negative consequences arising from China’s actions in the region, China’s 
willingness to provide financial support to the region indicates that there are greater 
opportunities for China if it continues the reforms to its aid provision that it has 
                                                        
113 Hanson, “China”, p.95 
42 
 
begun.114 This is important, because it also emphasises the importance that China 
places on economic development, which fuels its engagement with the region.115 The 
conclusion reached by Hanson is significant to the academic field, because the 
reforms highlighted in his analysis create opportunities for soft power-based 
approaches. This link between Chinese aid reforms in the South Pacific and soft 
power opens up space for research into the role of soft power. Hanson argues that 
there are already signs that China is reforming its aid provision, by making far fewer 
promises of flashy infrastructure projects than usual.116 China has also made 
tentative steps towards cooperating with other regional powers, such as 
collaborating with NZ on an infrastructure project in the Cook Islands.117 These 
examples are important, because they reinforce the conclusion that China’s aid 
programmes in the region holds potential benefits if they are reformed correctly. 
Hanson recommends that China become more transparent in its aid provision and 
coordinates its efforts with other donors. Because South Pacific values include a 
preference for consensus rather than majority rule, any shift by China towards a 
more cooperative method of aid distribution could increase its soft power in the 
region. 
The second major finding on China’s engagement with the South Pacific 
surrounds the nature of China’s engagement with the region. There are two main 
schools of thought concerning the nature of China’s engagement with the South 
Pacific, those who argue that China’s engagement with the region is relatively benign 
in the sense that China is not seeking to dominate the region, and those who believe 
that China poses a threat by seeking to take advantage of the region by using it for 
strategic and military influence. These differing conclusions can be attributed to the 
perspective of the author. Authors from traditional regional powers tend to take a 
more pessimistic view of China’s engagement. This can be seen in the offensive realist 
approach taken by Windybank, who proposes that China’s interest in the region is 
due to the strategic advantage of atoll states that lie close to the equator, which 
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provide an ideal location for satellite tracking and spying on nearby US military 
bases.118 This type of conclusion reached by authors from traditional powers is 
significant, because it can be observed as coming from a different perspective than 
those who conclude that China’s engagement is benign. The perspective of the author 
is important because it can be suggested to influence the way that they interpret their 
analysis. This can be seen in the earlier example from Windybank, an Australian 
academic whose analysis focused on the threat that China poses in the region. This is 
also true of the literature that concludes that China’s engagement in the region is 
benign, because the majority of authors who argue this are from the region. This can 
be seen in the conclusion reached by Iati Iati, who concludes that reservations about 
China’s presence are not reflected in the Samoan population, because China’s claim of 
being a friend holds a much more integral place in the Samoan psyche.119 This 
conclusion is important because it shows a distinct difference in interpretation 
between those authors who are outside of the region and those within. This however 
is not to say that the literature from within the region does not identify problems 
arising from China’s engagement. Much of the literature highlights concerns about 
China’s aid practices in the conclusions that they reach. Langa’oi highlights the 
consequences of relying on Chinese aid in the article, Chinese Diplomatic Relations 
with the Kingdom of Tonga. In this article, it is argued that Tonga’s dependence on 
foreign aid, and its relatively small number of key decision-makers, have combined to 
fuel China’s engagement with Tonga.120 It goes on to conclude that China’s use of aid 
for recognition has proved detrimental to Tonga, which has made Tonga dependent 
on China for aid to support its economy, due to its narrow economic base compared 
with other South Pacific states. 
The third major conclusion reached on China’s engagement with the South 
Pacific is that the region has become a testing ground for China’s increasing soft 
power. The literature has identified China’s increasing soft power as becoming a 
factor in its activities with the South Pacific. The authors argue that this has been 
influenced by the OC population in the South Pacific, who view China as a benevolent 
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and strong power as a result of its response to the recent unrest in some South Pacific 
countries.121 The authors also contend that the US withdrawal of support from the 
region, such as a pull-out by agencies like USAID and the Peace Corps, as well as 
diplomatic posts, has harmed the US’s soft power in the region which has opened up 
space for China to fill.122 This combination has allowed China to make use of its 
burgeoning soft power in the region. It concludes that the combination of increasing 
awareness of Chinese goods and services, Chinese programming, expanding 
educational exchanges, encouraging the study of Mandarin, and a boost to tourism 
have made the peoples of the South Pacific more aware of China’s presence and this 
has increased China’s soft power in the region. Iati concludes that the Samoan 
population do not share the reservations towards China of the traditional powers.123 
This suggests that China’s presence in the region has enhanced the soft power that it 
wields. This may also be due to the emphasis China places on its status as a 
“developing state”. This is significant because it highlights the need for further 
analysis of how Chinese soft power is affecting its engagement with the South Pacific. 
It does however identify challenges to China’s soft power in the region. Nelson 
highlights the issue of Chinese migrants being involved in illegal activities in Papua 
New Guinea, which reflects poorly on China’s reputation in the region.124 He goes 
further, arguing that illegal Chinese migration is undermining China’s reputation in 
the region, due to the resentment that Papua New Guineans hold towards Chinese 
who are perceived to be taking jobs from them.125 This suggests that Chinese soft 
power is being undermined by the activities of its people in the region.  
China’s activities to date in the South Pacific have been shown to be harmful 
by the arguments put forward by the authors. From the destructive short-term focus 
that China displays when providing aid, to the damaging corruption that is fostered 
by the diplomatic rivalry between China and Taiwan, China’s engagement so far has 
been criticised by the academic literature. Yet the three conclusions reached about 
Chinese engagement with the South Pacific are significant for any future analysis of 
                                                        
121 To, James Jiann Hua, "Sino-Pacifica: Extra-Territorial Influence and the Overseas Chinese", in Anne-
Marie Brady (ed.), Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan and the South Pacific (London: World 
Scientific, 2010), p.72 
122 Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific”, p.154 
123 Iati, “China and Samoa”, p.160 
124 Nelson, Hank, "Chinese in Papua New Guinea", in Terence Wesley-Smith and Edgar Porter (ed.), 
China in Oceania (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010), p.114 
125 Nelson, “Chinese in Papua New Guinea”, p.115 
45 
 
Chinese education programmes in the South Pacific, because they identify that China 
can play a positive role in the region. This is because the literature examines the 
nature of China’s engagement, the effects of Chinese aid, and the increasing 
importance of soft power in the South Pacific. These findings have shown a need for 
further analysis of Chinese soft power in the region, to identify solutions to enabling 
greater political and economic engagement by China in the South Pacific. 
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Chapter Three: 
China-Tonga bilateral relationship 
 
China’s official relations with Tonga can be traced back to the end of the Cold War, 
when the traditional powers began to withdraw from the South Pacific. China moved 
in to fill the void left by the US and former Soviet Union, developing formal 
relationships with several countries within the region. China officially established 
diplomatic relations with Tonga on November 2, 1998, when Tonga abruptly 
switched official recognition from Taiwan to China. This has led to the development 
of significant political, economic and cultural ties between the two countries. The 
history of China’s bilateral relations with Tonga must be examined prior to any 
analysis of the correlation between bilateral relations and soft power, because the 
China-Tonga relationship presents a number of unique aspects compared to China’s 
other relationships in the region. 
 
 The decision by Tonga to formally establish diplomatic relations with China 
came as a shock to actors in the region. This is because prior to the switch, Tonga had 
close ties to the ROC, frequently travelling to Taipei for official visits.126 China’s 
pursuit of official recognition from Tonga can be attributed to the diplomatic rivalry 
between it and Taiwan, for recognition on the international stage. China’s objective in 
this regard is the marginalisation of Taiwan by co-opting those states who have 
official relations with Taipei.127 China’s bilateral relationship with Tonga was greatly 
enhanced by the political ties it developed in the aftermath of its recognition switch. 
The basis of these political ties has rested on the frequent use of official visits by each 
state’s leaders. This has come to be known as “visit diplomacy”, or “smile diplomacy”, 
by officials. China has invited Tongan political leaders on several high profile state 
visits to China, as part of its drive to win over the island state. These official visits are 
often accompanied by promises of aid from China, which are a significant attraction 
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to small island states like Tonga with weak economies. One significant example of 
this visit diplomacy is the 1999 visit by Tongan King Tupou IV to Beijing, where the 
red carpet was rolled out and promises of aid were made by the Chinese 
government.128 The importance placed on visits by Tongan leaders emphasises the 
significance placed by China on its relationship with Tonga. 
Another aspect of China’s political ties with Tonga that contributes to the 
bilateral relationship is defence cooperation between the armed forces of the two 
countries. The official visits conducted between China and Tonga led to the 
establishment of cooperation between Tonga’s defence force and the Chinese PLA. 
This defence cooperation was quickly established following the announcement of 
official diplomatic relations, however it has been fairly limited compared to other 
Chinese defence cooperation. This is because China has limited its defence 
cooperation with Tonga to non-combat areas such as logistics, and infrastructure 
development.129 This cooperation includes the provision by China of martial arts 
training for members of the Tongan military.130 China’s cooperation with Tonga in 
the realm of defence has strengthened political ties at multiple levels. This is because 
in addition to the Tongan and Chinese leadership meeting and cooperating in the 
field of defence, this cooperation has connected the military leaders of both countries. 
The PLA has hosted several meetings with the leadership of the Tongan defence force, 
strengthening ties between the two militaries. Several meetings between PLA and 
Tongan defence force officials were held following the establishment of diplomatic 
relations, including a visit to Tonga by two deputies from the PLA in 2000.131 This 
example highlights the importance placed on defence cooperation as part of the 
political ties that were formed immediately following the establishment of diplomatic 
relations in 1998. 
 
 China’s use of financial aid and infrastructure projects in the South Pacific has 
proved an effective tool for deepening its bilateral relationship with Tonga. China has 
adopted a comprehensive approach to its economic engagement with Tonga, one that 
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has led to dependence by Tonga on China. To highlight this relationship and its effect 
on the bilateral relationship, China’s use of soft loans, its provision of infrastructure 
projects, and its trade relationship with Tonga will be examined to highlight the 
evolution of the China-Tonga relationship.  
 Soft loans have played a significant role in Chinese foreign policy since its 
opening-up process began in the 1970s. Soft loans are a type of loan offered by 
countries and international organisations that feature low interest rates, repayment 
holidays and flexible terms.132 China’s use of soft loans in the wider South Pacific 
region has become particularly prevalent. Hanson shows that Chinese aid reached a 
high of $US 153 million in 2008.133 This trend is particularly evident in Tonga, where 
the government has become particularly dependent on Chinese soft loans. Tonga’s 
government has accepted a number of soft loans from China, including one totalling 
$US 45 million in 2007/2008.134 China’s willingness to lend money without the usual 
strings attached, such as good governance conditions, and Tonga’s willingness to 
accept these loans has led to the dependent relationship that now exists. This has 
created significant problems for Tonga in its ability to repay the loans when they 
come due, because of the one-sided trade relationship that exists between the two 
countries, which will be examined later. This dependent relationship that exists 
between Tonga and China has led to Tonga incurring large debts, such as 
reconstruction aid for Nuku’alofa, which it will struggle to pay off. Hanson and Fifita 
explain that Tonga has borrowed the equivalent of one-third of its annual GDP from 
China.135 There is also increasing evidence to show that China is not prepared to wipe 
these debts out should Tonga prove unable to repay them. Hanson and Fifita have 
noted that South Pacific countries have requested that China forgive their loan debts, 
only to be rebuffed by the Asian superpower.136 China’s relationship with Tonga has 
created a dependence on Chinese aid, and Tonga is harmed by the increasing debt it 
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finds itself in. The benefits that China receives from this relationship will be 
examined in greater detail in later sections. 
 Infrastructure has become a significant area in which China has enhanced its 
bilateral relationship with Tonga. China has become a significant contributor of 
infrastructure such as roads, hospital buildings, and barracks, to the South Pacific. 
The use of infrastructure projects by China has stemmed from its increasing 
commitment to development assistance for countries in the region that have officially 
recognised it. The construction of infrastructure by China in the South Pacific has 
focused on projects with large visibility benefits, such as grandiose buildings, roads 
and harbour facilities. This has had both positive and negative impacts on the region, 
and Tonga in particular. Tonga’s bilateral relationship has seen a large scale increase 
in infrastructure development by China, such as refurbishment of airports, roads and 
convention centres.137 China has also played a role in strengthening its relations with 
Tonga by rebuilding the shopping districts of Nuku’alofa destroyed in the anti-
Chinese riots that occurred in 2006.138 This type of infrastructure development by 
China has had a positive effect on bilateral relations, as it makes Tongans more aware 
of China’s presence and the role it plays in their country. In addition to the positive 
outcomes from China’s provision of infrastructure to the region, the need for it to be 
visible in the South Pacific has led to the prioritisation of “visible” projects. This has 
meant that China has prioritised projects that are highly visible to the peoples of the 
country it is being built in. This is evident in countries like Tonga, where China built 
an extension to the royal palace in the Tongan capital, Nuku’alofa.139 This trend is 
particularly true in Tonga, where recent history highlights China’s willingness to 
provide infrastructure to the country. This has led to China building a number of 
projects that are costly to maintain or not needed by the communities they are built 
for. One example of this is a grant provided by China to build a convention centre in 
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the country.140 Tonga has benefited significantly from its bilateral relationship with 
China, in the form of infrastructure provision, but China’s priorities have resulted in 
unnecessary and costly projects that have made it difficult for Tonga to maintain. 
 The bilateral relationship between China and Tonga has progressed to the 
point where the two countries have expanded their relationship into the area of trade. 
This is an important aspect of bilateral relations, because it highlights the manner in 
which China is able to take advantage of Tonga due to its weak economic base. This is 
because Tonga does not have the developed tourism industry or large natural 
resource stocks of its neighbours, which makes it reliant on China. The trade 
relationship that exists between China and Tonga is very one-sided, based on trade 
statistics and anecdotal evidence. Trade between China and Tonga provides 
economic benefits to both countries, as China has access to a market for its goods, 
and Tonga has access to cheap Chinese imports. This is evident in statistics released 
by ANZ Bank, which states that in 2009, Tonga imported 5.9 percent of its goods from 
China, while for the same year its exports to China were a mere 0.9 percent of its total 
exports.141 China is also keen to take advantage of the natural resources that are 
available in Tonga. The South Pacific is home to large fish stocks, and China is seeking 
to take advantage of this to feed its growing population. To accomplish this, China has 
bought licences to fish within the EEZs of a number of South Pacific states. This is also 
true in Tonga, where not only has China purchased a licence to fish in the Tongan EEZ; 
it has also invested in infrastructure upgrades to ensure it is able to process the fish 
that it catches.142 This growing cooperation between China and Tonga in the area of 
fishing has led to increasing criticism of the damaging practices being employed by 
Chinese companies to catch fish. The Pacific Islands Tuna Industry Association has 
stated that the influx of Chinese fishing fleets is putting Tongan fishermen out of 
business, as more and more Chinese fishing boats are operating within Tonga’s 
EEZ.143 The developing trade relationship has allowed Tonga to gain access to cheap 
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products, but it has also allowed China to take advantage of Tonga’s natural resources, 
often to the detriment of Tongan citizens. 
 
The evolving bilateral relationship between China and Tonga has seen social 
relations between the two countries develop during the period since Tonga officially 
recognised China. Cultural relations have been recognised by China as a significant 
aspect of its foreign relations, and this significance can be observed in its official 
relations with Tonga. To highlight the importance placed by China on its social 
relations with Tonga, the use of media and culture will be examined to show the 
evolution of the bilateral relationship. 
China has taken full advantage of its media to enhance the social ties between 
it and Tonga. This is because China broadcasts CCTV-9 into the South Pacific, a 
channel interpreted as China’s foreign propaganda channel.144 By broadcasting its 
official propaganda channel into the region, China is able to broadcast its message 
straight into the homes of South Pacific peoples, giving it a direct form of 
communication with the people of the region, often in competition with NZ and 
Australian media who also broadcast into the region. This trend is also evident in 
Tonga, where China has used media to spread its message directly to the citizens of 
the country. As with the wider region, CCTV-9 is broadcast into Tonga. This has 
played a vital role in bolstering bilateral relations between the two countries, in large 
part because it educates Tongan audiences to China and its activities abroad. 
Crocombe argues that CCTV-9 educates Tongans to a country that they know little 
about, but need to understand better.145 Despite this, the attempts by China to use its 
media to educate Tongans about it and to enhance social relations have been limited 
due to the dull nature of programmes broadcast by CCTV-9.146 This has reduced the 
effectiveness of Chinese media in enhancing the social ties between it and Tonga, 
because it is used too much to propagandise. This use of CCTV-9 in Tonga has allowed 
China to educate the people about its motives; however, Ron Crocombe states that 
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the effectiveness of this message has been diluted by the perception that the shows 
broadcast by CCTV-9 are dull and trying to spread the Chinese government’s message. 
China has used its powerful historical and cultural background to help expose 
the peoples of the South Pacific to its society. This has involved sending cultural 
groups to South Pacific countries to perform, and brought exhibitions to the South 
Pacific that showcase Chinese culture. China has placed considerable importance on 
its culture and the role it plays in enhancing relations between China and the region. 
This is particularly true for Tonga, which has benefitted from China’s efforts to put its 
culture on display in the country. One such way in which China has put its culture on 
display in Tonga is the use of cultural delegations in schools. This allows Tongan 
students to be directly exposed to Chinese culture in a relaxed way that educates 
them about China without the obvious presence of official state action. One example 
of this is the visit to Tongan schools of a Chinese Wushu delegation, which visited 
schools in the country to show off dance and fight scenes that are part of the art of 
Wushu, among other cultural events.147 The students were reported to be very 
interested in the exhibition, which highlights the role that culture is playing in China’s 
efforts to increase understanding by Tongans of its cultural heritage.148 Programmes 
like these being provided by China to Tonga highlight the strengthening social 
relations between the two countries, which are part of an ever-increasing bilateral 
relationship in the region. 
 
The bilateral relationship between China and Tonga started from a relatively small 
position to become a wide-ranging and significant relationship. This relationship has 
had far-reaching consequences for Tonga, from the elite level to the local level. 
Whether it is the provision of significant amounts of financial aid by China, or the 
ability of Tongans to access cheap Chinese products, this bilateral relationship has 
touched Tongans at all levels of society. This relationship is still evolving, with 
education set to become a major area of focus for China in the coming years. The role 
that education is playing in educating Tongans about China will be analysed to assess 
the importance of it to the discourse of Chinese diplomacy. 
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Chapter Four: 
Chinese soft power in Tonga: the role of education in bilateral 
relations 
 
 The bilateral relationship between China and Tonga represents a new phase in 
China’s foreign relations. Tonga represents a unique case in the expansion of Chinese 
influence within the South Pacific, particularly due to the state of the economy and 
the role that the overseas Chinese community plays in Tongan society. The China-
Tonga relationship stands as a case study in need of deeper analysis, as it can provide 
insights into China’s role and position in economically dependent and socially divided 
societies like Tonga. The use of soft power by China in Tonga is an important aspect 
of this relationship, as China seeks to soften its image in the country as it deepens its 
relationship and becomes more visible. To properly understand the role that soft 
power is playing, this section will seek to examine a number of themes. Prior to any 
analysis of China’s provision of scholarships in Tonga, the bilateral relationship will 
be analysed to examine the areas that make it a unique case within the South Pacific. 
Following this, China’s policies in the wider region will be analysed to identify China’s 
priorities and objectives in the wider South Pacific. The following section will analyse 
China’s provision of scholarships in Tonga as a form of soft power, to identify the 
ways that China is seeking to improve its image. The expansion of China’s 
relationship will also be analysed, to enable this to be compared to the corresponding 
soft power initiatives. Finally, China’s relationship with Tonga will be compared to 
the bilateral relationship between China and South Africa, to highlight and examine 
the unique nature of the Chinese relationship with the South Pacific, compared to its 
established relations in Africa. This comparison will allow China’s bilateral 
relationship to be tested against another relationship, to examine whether it is a 
unique relationship, or whether it follows the pattern of other Chinese relationships. 
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4.1 China-Tonga bilateral relations: a unique case 
 
 The case of China’s relations with Tonga is particularly unique to the field of 
Chinese foreign relations. This is due to a number of external factors that have 
influenced the nature of the relationship. To better understand the nature of the 
China-Tonga relationship and its uniqueness compared to other South Pacific states 
who maintain relations with China, this section will examine the aspects of the China-
Tonga relationship that differ from the other relationships that China has in the 
region, analyse how they differ from those seen in other South Pacific states, and 
evaluate how these factors make the China-Tonga relationship unique to the region. 
 
Economic Dependence 
 
 The economy is one area where the unique nature of China’s relationship with 
Tonga is evident. Tonga has long been reliant on external sources for economic 
growth, whether it is in the form of remittances from overseas communities or the 
tourism industry. This reliance on external factors has resulted in the Tongan 
economy becoming heavily dependent on foreign actors for its economic growth. This 
weakness has been heavily exploited by large powers in taking advantage of Tonga 
for their own goals and objectives. To better understand this before analysing China’s 
role, the nature of the Tongan economy must be examined. The Tongan economy is 
heavily reliant on external factors, such as the industries it relies on, the state of 
Tongan exports, and the nature of foreign aid provision. 
 
Tonga’s major industries all share a common trait; they are vulnerable to 
external factors. The three largest industries in Tonga are agriculture, tourism and 
fisheries. These three industries all rely heavily on overseas markets for their 
prosperity. In the case of agriculture, it accounts for almost two-thirds of Tonga’s 
total exports.149 Tonga’s agricultural sector is particularly reliant on overseas 
markets, due to the largest exports going to markets in Japan, Korea and New Zealand. 
Tonga’s major exports are animal products and vegetable products such as squash, 
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root plants and coconuts.150 The significant proportion of Tongan exports that come 
from agriculture means that the Tongan economy is particularly vulnerable to 
economic downturns and price decreases in its exports.151 In a speech given by the 
Tongan Prime Minister, he states that the economy has been significantly affected by 
the Global Financial Crisis, which has resulted in less growth than expected in the 
agricultural sector.152 This combination of the GFC and the large proportion of export 
revenue Tonga earns from agriculture has been shown to create significant 
vulnerability in Tonga’s economy, which creates a need for economic growth. This 
can be suggested to have contributed to the dependence on foreign assistance that 
the Tongan economy experiences. 
The second major industry that is vulnerable to external factors is tourism, 
which is heavily dependent on foreign visitors to the country, yet is significantly 
underdeveloped compared to other South Pacific states. This is because tourism is 
influenced by a number of conditions which are often outside of the control of the 
Tongan government. One condition outside of their control is the Global Financial 
Crisis, which has been discussed earlier. The GFC has caused tourist numbers to fall 
across the world, as economic conditions influence the amount of money people have 
to spend. This has resulted in the shrinking of the tourism industries of a number of 
countries. The evidence suggests that the GFC has affected the number of tourists 
visiting Tonga, making the economy weaker as one of its largest industries struggles. 
Since the start of the GFC the tourism industry went from 46,000 air visitors in 2007 
to 45,000 in 2010.153 This suggests that Tonga’s tourism industry has shrunk because 
of the GFC, which highlights the vulnerability of the Tongan economy to external 
factors such as the GFC. 
The third major industry in Tonga that is vulnerable to external factors is the 
fisheries industry. Tonga’s EEZ is comparatively large compared to the rest of the 
world, and possesses large stocks of tuna and other fish. This makes it an important 
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part of the Tongan economy, but also vulnerable to external factors. This industry has 
become particularly significant to outside actors, particularly emerging economies 
looking to feed their expanding populations. This has led to increasing investment in 
Tonga’s fishing industry, as these states seek to open up greater access. Despite this, 
Tonga’s fishing industry is shrinking as a percentage of the country’s GDP. 
Government statistics state that the contribution of the fisheries industry to Tonga’s 
economy as a percentage of GDP has fallen by 23 percent between 2005 and 2011.154 
This can be attributed to several external factors, which have all contributed to the 
fall in contribution of fisheries as a major industry. One such external factor is the 
problem of illegal fishing that occurs within Tonga’s EEZ. This has created problems 
around the health of Tongan fisheries, as illegal fishing depletes fish stocks and is not 
subject to accountability. One such example of this is Tonga’s forced closure of a sea 
cucumber fishery in 2012, due to depletion from illegal fishing.155 Illegal fishing is 
often undertaken by foreign fishing vessels that are often able to flout laws around 
fishing in the region, due to the comparatively large size of its maritime economic 
zone. The FFA highlights the case of a Taiwanese fishing vessel that was prosecuted 
for illegally fishing in Tongan waters.156 The two examples provided highlight the 
problems facing Tonga’s fishing industry, due to external factors such as illegal 
fishing by foreign vessels. 
This reliance on agriculture and fisheries means that Tonga is reliant on 
exporting its products to provide income for its economy. This makes it reliant on 
external factors such as the trade policies of its major trading partners, and the state 
of the global economy. The Tongan economy is reliant on four major countries as 
destinations for its exports; these countries are: Australia, Japan, US, and NZ. As a 
proportion of total exports, Tonga is reliant on these countries for 94 percent of its 
exports. Despite this, Tonga is still facing a negative balance of trade with all of its 
major trading partners. This is because it is heavily reliant on these countries for 
many of the goods that are sold in Tonga. In the first quarter of 2012 Tonga exported 
$566,528 worth of goods to New Zealand, its fourth-largest export trading partner, 
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yet it imported $21,916,655 worth of goods from NZ.157 This example highlights the 
reliance that Tonga has on its external trading partners, due to its geographic 
isolation. Tonga has faced an increasing negative balance of trade since 1997, where 
it was just below $100 million.158 This negative balance of trade increased between 
1997 and 2011, where it grew to $305 million.159 This example highlights the reliance 
of the Tongan economy on external factors such as foreign imports and exports for its 
growth. It also shows that the export sector is unable to cover the cost of importing 
goods for sale, which creates further reliance on external factors. This will be 
examined and greater detail in the following section. 
 The relative weakness of Tongan exports has created a situation where 
Tonga has high comparative debt, making it significantly reliant on foreign aid to 
survive.160 The CIA Factbook on Tonga identifies that it is dependent on external aid 
and remittances to reduce its deficit. This aid comes from a variety of sources, with a 
wide range of motives, but provides a significant proportion of Tonga’s annual 
income. The CIA estimates Tonga’s annual GDP to be at $439 million, of which foreign 
aid makes up a significant proportion.161 This has made the country reliant on 
relationships with existing powers such as Australia and NZ, as well as rising powers 
such as China. This reliance on foreign aid as part of its annual budget is highlighted 
by the Tongan statistics department, which states that between 2002 and 2005 
Tonga received T$24,031,000 in budgetary aid. In addition to this, NZAID has 
provided Tonga with NZ$20 million in the 2011/2012 financial year.162 AUSaid has 
also allocated AUS$33.8 million for the 2012/2013 financial year.163 These amounts 
highlight the significant role that foreign aid plays in the Tongan economy, as the 
figures make up a significant proportion of annual GDP. The problems posed by this 
aid in regards to Tonga’s deficit have been highlighted in the media. The NZ Herald 
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reported on the measures Tonga is having to take to repay a loan from China. These 
measures included closing its high commission in Wellington.164 The examples 
provided highlight the dependence that Tonga has on external actors, which has been 
exacerbated by the foreign aid provided to it. 
The three areas examined here have highlighted the significant problems 
facing the Tongan economy. These problems are unique, in that Tonga is subject to 
vulnerability in all of its major industries, which is not often seen. The reliance that 
Tonga has on external actors for its exports, imports and foreign aid are all unique 
compared to other states in the region. The following section will examine China’s 
role in these industries, compared to its role in other South Pacific economies. 
 
The vulnerabilities identified in the previous section have been taken 
advantage of by China, as it seeks to further integrate itself into Tongan society as 
part of its bilateral relationship. This has led to Tonga becoming heavily reliant on 
China for its economic growth, as its largest industries become squeezed due to 
external factors. To highlight this, the section will examine China’s role in Tongan 
industries, imports and exports, and aid dependence. This will show how China is 
becoming involved in Tonga’s economy in a way that is not usually seen in other 
parts of the South Pacific. 
Tonga’s agriculture industry has been shown to be a significant player in the 
Tongan economy, as it accounts for a large proportion of the country’s GDP. China’s 
growing engagement with the country has influenced the agriculture industry, due to 
its behaviour in regards to imports and exports. Tonga has become a destination for 
some of the cheap goods produced in China, accounting for a proportion of Tonga’s 
annual imports. This is highlighted in statistics released by ANZ, which state that 
China’s exports to Tonga have been steadily increasing, from 2.2 percent of its total 
exports in 2000 to 5.9 percent in 2009.165 This increase suggests that Tonga is 
becoming a desirable market for China’s exports. An alternative explanation for the 
increase is that the increase in imports is due to loan-related import requirements. 
Despite this, Tonga has been granted little access to Chinese markets for its own 
exports. This is also highlighted by the ANZ in their annual Pacific Quarterly, which 
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reports that during the same period exports from Tonga to China grew slightly from 
zero percent in 2000 to 0.4 percent in 2009.166 This is further evidenced in the export 
statistics released by the Tongan government, which state that in 2010 China was 
ranked ninth among countries of destination for Tonga’s exports, with a total of 
$81,271 in exports from Tonga.167 This is significant to the vulnerability of the 
Tongan economy because it highlights the lack of reciprocal trade in the China-Tonga 
economic relationship. 
China’s role in the Tongan fisheries industry is also causing harm to the wider 
economy. This is due to the presence of Chinese fishing companies and the subsidies 
provided to these companies to fish in Tonga’s EEZ. This has harmed the Tongan 
fishing industry, as local fishers struggle to compete with the Chinese fleet that is 
backed by these subsidies. PITIA chairman Charles Hufflett explains that China 
provides fuel subsidies to any Chinese fishing vessels that spend more than $US 700 
on fuel per ton of fish caught.168. PITIA also states that these subsidies are preventing 
Tongan fishermen from entering the industry, due to the unequal nature of the 
competition.169 These examples highlight the barriers that the Tongan fishing 
industry faces due to Chinese involvement. The inability of Tongan fishing boats to 
compete with Chinese subsidies is important, because it shows how vulnerable the 
industry is to external factors such as subsidies to foreign fishing vessels they 
compete with. 
China’s increasing involvement in Tonga’s construction industry has occurred 
in partnership with the increase in Chinese soft loans to the country. This is due to 
conditions attached to these loans which prevent Tongan construction firms from 
winning contracts for infrastructure projects that are funded with Chinese loans. One 
such example of this is the reconstruction of the Nuku’alofa CBD following the 2006 
riots, which was funded by China. As part of the soft loans provided, the China Civil 
Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) was contracted to complete the 
reconstruction.170 This example highlights the problems posed by China’s soft loans 
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in Tonga, and the harm it causes the Tongan economy. It also shows how susceptible 
Tonga’s construction industry is to external factors such as Chinese soft loans.  
China has an active role in the Tongan import markets, as it seeks another 
destination for its cheap goods. This has impacted on Tonga’s dependence on 
external actors, as China takes advantage of the country as a destination for its goods 
without reciprocating.  This is significant because it reinforces the dependent nature 
of Tonga’s relationship with China, as it relies on it for cheap goods but does not gain 
any reciprocal benefit by exporting goods to China. This is evident in the statistics 
relating to China’s exports to Tonga compared to its imports from the country. 
Despite China benefitting from the Tongan market, Tonga has failed to get its exports 
into the Chinese market. This highlights the way that China is making Tonga 
dependent on it for economic growth and deficit reduction, due to the unconditional 
nature of their trade relationship. 
The use of financial aid as part of its bilateral relationship with Tonga has 
significantly contributed to Tonga’s dependence on China. This is due in large part to 
the narrow base that Tonga’s economy is formed on, which was examined in previous 
sections. This narrow base has meant that Tonga is reliant on external sources of 
capital such as financial aid and remittances from overseas Tongan communities. 
This has allowed China to become a significant source of financial aid to Tonga, due to 
its large financial wealth and lack of conditions attached to the aid that it provides. 
China has provided Tonga with significant amounts of aid, often in the form of soft 
loans. These soft loans come with conditions that are far more relaxed than 
traditional loans. This has meant that Tonga has accrued significant levels of debt 
through these Chinese soft loans. In the financial year 2007/2008 Tonga borrowed 
$NZ 54 million in soft loans from China.171 Cases such as this have created significant 
issues for Tonga around its economic deficit. This is highlighted in the same article, 
which states that Tonga is facing a $NZ 20 million deficit, and is having to close some 
of its high commissions to cut costs.172 Of this deficit, debt to China plays a significant 
part. A recent news article states that Tonga’s debt to China makes up 23 percent of 
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its GDP.173 The lack of conditions and freedom with which China provides these soft 
loans has been attributed with the rise in Tongan debt, as Tonga often accepts these 
loans in the belief that China will write them off should they be unable to repay it.174 
This belief is based on past Chinese debt forgiveness, however China has recently 
turned down two requests for debt forgiveness.175 This example highlights the 
dependence that Tonga has on China for its economic growth and deficit reduction, 
due to the reliance it has on Chinese aid. 
China’s involvement in Tonga’s three main industries, its unequal role as a 
trading partner, and its provision of financial aid has been shown in this section to 
have contributed to its vulnerability to external factors, which is a unique aspect of 
the relationship not often seen in China’s other bilateral relationships in the region. 
 
Ethnic Tensions 
 
 Tonga has experienced increasing issues due to the changing ethnic face of its 
society, due in large part to unchecked illegal Chinese immigration into the country. 
This has created issues that are not common across the rest of the region. The 
increasing ethnic tensions in Tonga can be attributed to a number of variables that 
exist in the country. To properly understand how ethnic tensions are a unique aspect 
of the China-Tonga relationship, this section will analyse the Chinese immigration 
into Tonga, the role of Chinese commerce in Tongan society, and the Nuku’alofa riots 
to highlight how these variables have influence the official relationship. 
 The rapid migration of Chinese peoples into the South Pacific has created 
issues around criminal activity and unchecked immigration from China. This is 
particularly true of Tonga, which has seen considerable ethnic change over the past 
thirty years, which has led to rising ethnic tension.  This can be attributed to 
unchecked immigration policies initiated by the government to draw revenue. Tonga 
has a small Chinese population, making up 1.1 percent of the Tongan population at 
the 2006 census.176 Legal Chinese immigration into Tonga can be attributed to a 
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number of schemes initiated by the government to generate income and expand the 
labour pool for its economy. These “cash-for-passport” schemes, established in 1983, 
are estimated to be worth billions; due to Chinese citizens’ desire for a second 
passport should things deteriorate in China.177 The South China Morning Post 
reported that Tonga sought to sell seven thousand Tongan passports for up to 
$20,000 in 1996, prior to Hong Kong’s transfer of sovereignty.178 This is significant to 
the China-Tonga bilateral relationship, because it brings associated costs to the 
country. Such costs include the prospect of illegal activities, due to the lack of 
oversight associated with the passport sales. This fear was underlined by the 
Independent Commission Against Corruption, which states that those involved in the 
purchase of Tongan passports may be tempted to run illegal enterprises.179 This has 
become a significant problem in Tonga, as Chinese immigrants gain citizenship legally 
then establish criminal enterprises, often involving prostitution, gambling or drugs. 
This can be seen in news reports from the country, which record increased cases of 
people trafficking and prostitution, among other crimes committed by Chinese 
nationals. A Chinese woman was found guilty of trafficking Chinese women into 
Tonga, trading in prostitution, and operating a brothel.180 This example is significant, 
because it highlights a growing problem in the China-Tonga bilateral relationship that 
is relatively unique to the country. This has occurred in other countries in the region, 
but not to the extent that it is occurring in Tonga. 
 Another aspect of the China-Tonga bilateral relationship that has created and 
enhanced ethnic tensions in the country is the role of Chinese immigrants in 
commerce in Tonga. This is due to the differences in behaviour and attitudes held by 
Chinese and Tongan business people. The policies initiated by the Tongan 
government of unrestricted immigration, particularly of Chinese peoples, have led to 
a change in the way that business is conducted in Tongan society. This change has 
caused tension between the native Tongans and the Chinese immigrants, due to the 
perception that these immigrants are taking jobs and business away from the Tongan 
community. This is significant, because it highlights the instability that the increasing 
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relationship between China and Tonga is creating. This increasing instability can be 
attributed to fears that the rising Chinese presence is destroying the “Tongan way of 
life”, as this changing ethnic ratio alters the way that commerce is exercised. Chinese 
have rapidly taken over the local grocery stores.181 Where there were no foreign-
owned stores twenty years ago, Chinese immigrants have expanded since 1987 to 
own seventy percent of grocery stores in the country.182 This example highlights the 
changing demographics in Tonga that are fuelling the ethnic tensions. The result of 
these changes is acts of violence such as the case of a Chinese shop under 
construction, which was torn down by local Tongan youths.183 This example 
highlights how the growing China-Tonga relationship has fuelled ethnic tensions 
within the country, as more Chinese enter the country and upset the traditional 
cultural balance. 
 This combination of unregulated Chinese immigration into Tonga, and its 
corresponding effect on Tongan commerce, has led to flashpoint incidents occurring 
as the native Tongan citizens’ vent their anger in violent incidents. This is a fairly 
unique aspect of the relationship, as China has not faced such riots in the majority of 
other South Pacific states. The most significant incident to have occurred as a result 
of the increasing China-Tonga relationship has been the 2006 Nuku’alofa riots. It can 
be suggested that one of the factors that led to the riots was the increase in Chinese 
immigrants, and the consequences of this increased immigration. This is significant, 
because it highlights the problems associated with the China-Tonga relationship at 
that time. China was focusing much of its attention on the political elites within Tonga, 
which ignored problems faced by Tongan citizens as a result of the increasing 
relationship, such as tensions from new Chinese immigrants pushing in on Tongan 
grocery stores. This is evident in the Chinese presence in local shops, which have 
threatened the livelihoods of local Tongans. Factors like this led to an outbreak of 
violence against Chinese-owned shops and other property in the capital Nuku’alofa in 
2006. The riots led to the central business district of Nuku’alofa being largely 
destroyed and Chinese migrants being evacuated due to the attacks on their 
businesses. China Daily reported on efforts by the Chinese government to evacuate its 
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citizens from the country by using privately chartered aircraft.184 This example 
highlights the instability that focusing on the political elite level of the China-Tonga 
relationship has had on Tonga, and why China had to move its focus towards the 
citizens of Tonga, as part of its quest to enhance the political and economic 
relationship. 
 
 The China-Tonga bilateral relationship has featured a number of factors that 
are not commonly found in China’s other relationships within the region. Two 
examples of this are economic dependence and ethnic tensions. The case of the 2006 
Nuku’alofa riots is also an example of what can happen when these factors combine 
with a lack of focus on the citizens of a country, to create anger among the Tongan 
people about China’s increasing presence in the country. The following section will 
examine China’s policies in the wider South Pacific, and examine which can be 
considered hard power and which can be considered soft power. These policies will 
then be evaluated to highlight the relationship between the two. 
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4.2 Chinese policies across the South Pacific 
 
 In addition to establishing and expanding a bilateral relationship with Tonga, 
China has also developed relationships with several other countries in the region. 
China has taken a very economically-based approach to its relations with other South 
Pacific states. To highlight the nature of China’s relationship with other states in the 
South Pacific, and the differences compared to its relationship with Tonga, the 
following features will be analysed: the role that natural resources play, the role of 
undemocratic regimes, and the nature of military cooperation. 
 
 The South Pacific possesses significant natural resource reserves, which have 
become a significant attraction for developing economies like China. This is due in 
large part to the abundance of natural gas, timber, and other minerals that exist in 
some South Pacific states. As a developing economy, China is on a global hunt for 
access to more and more resources, to fuel its economic modernisation. This has 
influenced its relations with several states in the South Pacific, and differs 
significantly from the nature of its relations with Tonga. This is because Tonga does 
not possess significant natural resources like natural gas, timber or minerals outside 
of seabed deposits which are expensive to access. The largest source of these types of 
resources for China in the region is from Papua New Guinea. This is due to PNG’s 
large reserves of copper, gold, oil and natural gas, which account for most two-thirds 
of its export earnings. The British Geological Survey reported that Papua New Guinea 
produced 850,000 tonnes of copper between 2006 and 2010.185 This makes PNG one 
of the top producers of copper in the world, as well as other valuable minerals. China 
has formed a strong relationship with PNG, in part to secure access to these natural 
resources, which can be seen in its development of mining projects through Chinese 
private-sector mining companies. One such example of this is the Ramu Nickel project, 
which is operated by Chinese mining company, China Metallurgical Group 
Corporation. This project is Papua New Guinea’s largest foreign investment, as it is 85 
percent owned by CMGC.186 The Ramu Nickel project is one example of China’s 
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involvement in the mining industry in the South Pacific, which has become an 
important source of minerals such as nickel, cobalt and gold. This has resulted in 
significant increases in China-PNG trade, as China seeks to increase its access to the 
minerals it needs for its modernisation programme. This is highlighted by ANZ in 
their annual statement on Pacific economies. Exports from PNG to China almost 
doubled, reaching $780 million between 2009 and 2010.187 The importance of 
natural resources such as minerals to China’s modernisation is highlighted when PNG 
exports are compared to the total exports from the South Pacific to China. In 2010 the 
South Pacific exported $1.1 billion worth of products to China.188 PNG’s natural 
resource exports accounted for 70.9 percent of all exports from the South Pacific to 
China in 2010. Another South Pacific state that has become an important source of 
natural resources for China is the Solomon Islands. This is due to large reserves of 
timber, which China is seeking greater access to as demand for timber grows 
exponentially in its domestic market.189 This Chinese demand for timber has driven 
the expansion of its relationship with the Solomon Islands. Statistics show that 
Solomon Island exports to China increased by over one hundred percent to $66 
million between the 2005 and 2006 financial years.190 This contrasts with the China-
Tonga relationship, due to the relative lack of natural resources compared to states 
like PNG and the Solomon Islands. The abundance of natural resources has influenced 
the importance of China’s relationship with these states, compared to its relationship 
with Tonga. This is evidenced by the heavily tilted trade statistics for the South 
Pacific region. The cases of PNG and the Solomon Islands highlight the differences 
between China’s relationship with Tonga and its relationship with other South Pacific 
states, due to the role of natural resources and how they have influenced the nature 
of the relationship. 
  
 
Another aspect of China’s relationship with the South Pacific that differs from 
its relationship with Tonga is the nature of its relationship with fellow non-
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democratic regimes in the region. The nature of China’s relationship with non-
democratic regimes is significant, because it differs significantly from the relationship 
that China has developed with Tonga.  The most visible non-democratic regime in the 
South Pacific is Fiji, which suspended its democracy following a military coup in 2006. 
This has allowed China to adopt a stance that differentiates it from the other major 
regional powers. This has allowed China to assume the role of Fiji’s closest ally, 
providing aid, trade, military cooperation and a powerful voice in international 
organisations. The suspension of democracy in Fiji has led to a deterioration of 
official relations with its traditional allies, Australia and NZ. This has opened up a gap 
that China has moved into, allowing it to evolve its relationship with the Fijian regime. 
China has become a vocal supporter of Fiji’s sovereignty, and Fiji has also expressed 
support for Chinese sovereignty. This is significant, because it allows the Fijian 
regime to remain represented within international organisations. China joins several 
other developing states in ensuring Fiji retains a voice globally, these other states 
include India, Japan and Indonesia. This is due to China’s refusal to follow the lead of 
Western powers in condemning the military coup.191 Following China’s refusal to 
condemn the Fijian military coup, Fiji spoke out in support of its ally following the 
deadly riots in Lhasa and China’s deadly actions in suppressing the riots.192 These 
examples of reciprocal support for actions that were criticised by the West highlight 
the importance of this relationship. 
The Fiji-China relationship is beneficial to both sides, due to complimentary 
objectives held by each state. To properly examine this, the motives of both states 
will be analysed to show how the relationship differs from the China-Tonga 
relationship. The major overarching motive that has driven China’s commitment to 
Fiji is the need to keep Taiwan out of the country. Despite Fiji’s adherence to the “One 
China” policy, it is one of the few South Pacific states to also house a Taiwan 
Economic Office.193 Any attempt by China to follow the Western powers in 
condemning the military regime would likely see Taiwan move in to take advantage 
of the situation. This is highlighted by Hanson, who states in a recent opinion piece 
that “on the one hand, Western states are asking it (China) to help isolate the new 
dictatorship in Fiji. On the other, China faces the risk of losing a Fiji starved of funds 
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to its renegade province, Taiwan”.194 One way that China’s relationship with the 
military regime in Fiji differs from its relationship with Tonga is through the 
willingness of China’s top leadership to visit the country. Fiji’s status as a pivot state 
in the region is also an important factor in the Chinese relationship. Fiji was the first 
state in the South Pacific to host a visit from Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, in 2006.195 
During such visits, Chinese leaders have also provided moral support to the military 
regime against Western pressure. This is evident in the 2007 interview on Fiji TV 
with the deputy director of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deng Hongbo. In 
the interview, he states that Western powers must take a more understanding 
approach to its engagement with Fiji.196 He also calls for no unilateral action against 
Fiji, and expresses support for Fiji’s plans to hold democratic elections.197 China’s 
desire to keep Taiwan out of Fiji has complimented the Fijian military regime’s 
motives for greater cooperation with China. The regime’s motives for greater 
cooperation rest on the need to circumvent the efforts of traditional regional powers 
to force it to reinstate democracy in Fiji. This is largely due to the willingness of China 
to act as an alternate source of political and economic support. China has been a vocal 
supporter of the Fijian military regime since it took power in 2006. This has allowed 
Fiji to maintain a vocal presence in the region, and in international organisations. 
China spoke out following the coup, stating that it did not wish to become involved in 
Fiji’s internal politics and respected its status as an independent nation.198 
This political support from Fiji has been associated with Chinese financial aid, 
which has largely picked up the slack left by Australia and NZ, after they imposed 
sanctions on the country following its coup.199 This is evident in statements made by 
Fijian officials, which emphasise the closeness of Fiji’s relationship with China. At the 
opening of a bridge built with Chinese funds, the Fijian vice-President was quoted as 
saying that the China-Fiji relationship is one of its most important.200 China has also 
been critical of great power chauvinism in Fiji. These examples are significant, 
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because it highlights the important role that Fiji’s non-democratic regime has played 
in enhancing the relationship between the two countries. This is also significant in 
that it is not evident in Tonga, which as a constitutional monarchy has partial 
democracy. This suggests that the similarly non-democratic nature of the two 
countries’ regimes have been a major influencing factor in their relationship. 
 
 The final Chinese policy that is significantly different from its policies with 
Tonga is its use of some South Pacific states as venues to further its military-related 
programmes. This has created issues around the nature of China’s presence and the 
related instability that these installations and programmes can cause to the region. 
The South Pacific is geographically suited for China’s growing presence in the spheres 
of defence and space technology. As part of this, it has become involved with South 
Pacific states to develop its capacities in these areas. China’s space programme has 
created controversy in the region, as other Pacific powers accuse the country of using 
it as a cover for surveillance on its military operations. This is particularly evident in 
the case of Kiribati’s decision to allow China to establish a satellite tracking station on 
one of its atolls. The US expressed concerns that China was using the satellite tracking 
station as cover to conduct surveillance on the nearby US military facilities.201 This 
project was subsequently abandoned by Beijing after Kiribati switched recognition to 
Taipei. This example is significant, because it shows that China’s defence policies 
make its conduct with other South Pacific states significantly different from its 
conduct with Tonga. 
The second area that makes China’s conduct with South Pacific different from 
its relationship with Tonga is the area of defence cooperation. China provides limited 
assistance to Tonga’s military; however this assistance is in the form of logistics, such 
as new uniforms and vehicles. China’s defence cooperation with other South Pacific 
states is more advanced than its cooperation with Tonga. China is increasingly 
expanding its defence cooperation with several South Pacific states, despite its 
assurances that it is not seeking to establish a base in the region. News reports claim 
that China is expanding its defence cooperation with the militaries of PNG and Fiji. 
This is significant because it highlights a shift in approach that is not evident in its 
relationship with Tonga. This suggests that China’s objectives in each country 
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determine the nature of its relationships. China’s expansion of military cooperation 
with Fiji can be attributed to the increasing importance of its relationship with the 
military regime. The increasing military relationship between China and Fiji was 
highlighted in a media article about the increasing US concern about China’s growing 
role in the region.202 This example suggests that China’s increasing military 
relationship with Fiji is coinciding with its growing wider relationship with the 
country, which may provide an explanation for why it is expanding its military 
cooperation with the country. 
This correlation can also be seen in the growing military relationship between 
China and PNG. China’s close economic ties with PNG in the area of gas and mineral 
exploration make it a strategically important partner, as part of its modernisation 
programme. The expansion of military cooperation between China and PNG comes at 
the same time as Chinese companies are investing greater amounts of capital and 
labour into mining operations in the country. The nature of China-PNG military 
cooperation began with the provision of non-combat logistical equipment, and 
training exchanges between the two militaries.203 In recent years however, there 
have been calls from the Chinese and PNG governments to expand the military 
relationship. Chinese defence minister Liang Guangli stated at a recent bilateral 
meeting that China was ready to take substantial measures to advance military ties to 
a new level.204 This example is significant, because it shows a willingness on the part 
of China to expand the military ties between it and PNG, as it also expands its 
economic ties. China stands to benefit considerably from this expansion in military 
ties, as it strengthens PNG’s adherence to the One-China policy.205 This suggests that 
China is seeking to indirectly protect its investments within PNG, by ensuring that the 
PNG defence force is able to ensure stability and security within the country. 
The cases of China’s expansion of its satellite programme and its willingness to 
expand military assistance within the region are significant in that they are not seen 
in its relationship with Tonga. This evidence suggests that China is not prepared to 
risk destabilising its relationship with Tonga or to create the risk of confrontation 
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with the US over it. This is important because it also suggests that China values its 
relationship with Tonga and does not wish to jeopardise it. 
 
 The analysis of China’s quest for natural resource access, support for non-
democratic regimes and increasing military cooperation highlights significant 
differences that exist in China’s relationship with Tonga and its relationships in the 
wider South Pacific region. The analysis has shown that while China is drawn to other 
countries primarily for their natural resources, political similarities or suitability for 
advancing China’s own programmes, its relationship with Tonga is not based solely 
on these priorities. Despite efforts by China to introduce soft power-based initiatives 
in other countries in the region, the policies that differ from its relationship with 
Tonga could be considered as expressions of hard power. The following section will 
analyse China’s provision of scholarships to Tongan students as a form of soft power 
to improve its image, at that same as it is expanding its political and economic 
engagement with Tonga. 
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4.3 Chinese provision of scholarships in Tonga 
 
 The expansion of the China-Tonga bilateral relationship created tensions 
among Tongan citizens threatened by the increasing Chinese presence in Tongan 
society. China has complimented its increasing political and economic engagement 
with an increasingly significant attempt to educate ordinary Tongans as to its culture, 
values and role in their country. China has undertaken this by promoting educational 
exchanges to China for Tongan students, using scholarships that allow students to 
travel to China to further their studies and learn about Chinese culture and values. 
China’s scholarship programme in Tonga will be analysed to show that China has 
used these scholarships as a form of soft power to pave the way for its increasing 
political and economic engagement. To accomplish this, the chapter will analyse the 
components of the scholarship scheme, to identify what it is they provide. Following 
this, the number of scholarships provided by China each year will be analysed to 
examine how this reflects the China’s soft power objectives. The number of 
scholarships accepted by Tongan students each year will also be analysed. Finally, the 
relationship between the provision of these scholarships and the expansion of China’s 
political and economic engagement will be analysed, to identify correlations, trends 
or anomalies in the relationship. 
 
Scholarship Components 
 
 China has become an increasingly attractive option for exchange students. In 
2012 four Chinese universities broke into the top one hundred rankings, up from two 
on the previous year.206 China provides scholarships to study abroad for a number of 
tertiary students in Tonga, allowing them to study in China and learn about Chinese 
culture, values and society. The provisions included within these scholarships 
provide an insight into Chinese efforts to educate Tongan students as part of its 
engagement with the country. The scholarships provided by China include several 
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mechanisms with which the students on exchange are exposed to China’s culture, 
values, and society. These mechanisms include the type of accommodation provided, 
the allowances provided to students for travel, and Chinese language training. These 
mechanisms will be analysed to show how they are increasing Tongan students’ 
understanding of China, and how this is making it possible for China to enhance its 
political and economic engagement with Tonga.  
 
 When students accept scholarships to study abroad, accommodation becomes 
an important part of the student’s time in that country. Accommodation can play a 
significant role in shaping the opinions held by students who participate in these 
exchanges, as it exposes them to the culture, values and language of that country. This 
is also true of China’s scholarships for Tongan students to study abroad, and includes 
mechanisms to influence the perceptions of Chinese culture held by these students. 
Culture, as identified by Nye, is an important part of soft power. It possesses 
significant powers of attraction, primarily due to its ability to exist at multiple levels 
of society. Because of this, it has become important for states wishing to enhance 
their soft power to educate the peoples they are targeting about their culture. It is for 
this reason that the type of accommodation provided by China within their education 
scholarships is important to its efforts to enhance its soft power among Tongans. The 
most frequent accommodation option offered in the scholarships is the provision of 
financial allowances to allow the exchange students to live in campus dormitories at 
the chosen university. The choice of dormitories as the preferred accommodation for 
exchange students is important, because it places them in an environment that 
maximises their opportunity to be exposed to Chinese culture and values. This 
provision is set out in the terms and conditions of the major scholarships available to 
Tongan students. The terms and conditions of the China-PIF Scholarship Programme 
set out that exchange students will be provided with accommodation in campus 
dormitories, and be exempted from paying accommodation fees for these 
dormitories.207  
The provision of dormitory accommodation is significant to the projection of 
soft power on the part of China, because it allows China to shape the way that these 
                                                        
207 China Scholarship Council, "China/PIF Scholarship Programme", 2012, 
http://en.csc.edu.cn/Laihua/scholarshipdetailen.aspx?cid=97&id=1286 (accessed November 19 2012) 
74 
 
students experience Chinese culture and values. This form of accommodation is 
conducive to enhancing the perceptions of exchange students, because housing these 
students within campus dormitories means that they are living with fellow students, 
which allows them to experience the culture and values that influence the lives of 
Chinese students. This is due in large part to the growing attractiveness of Chinese 
film, theatre, herbal medicine, cuisine, martial arts and other aspects of Chinese 
culture that have become increasingly popular. This is evident in the renewed focus 
on advertising Chinese culture by government officials. The South China Morning 
Post reports that culture is to play a vital role in the latest five year plan; to boost 
China’s soft power.208 The decision by the Chinese government to use dormitory 
accommodation for Tongan exchange students is significant, because it suggests that 
this accommodation type is being used to expose the students to Chinese culture and 
values, to enhance its soft power. This is also evidenced by the statements made by 
Chinese officials of the need to further promote the Chinese culture as part of its 
wider efforts to enhance its soft power. 
 
 A second important component of scholarships to study overseas has been the 
allocation of travel allowances for students. This is significant to the analysis of 
Chinese efforts to enhance its soft power among Tongan exchange students, because 
travel allowances allow these students to visit sites around China and learn more 
about its history and culture. The role of culture in enhancing soft power is already 
well-known, but the ways in which culture can be exploited or taken advantage of is 
still relatively new. It is in this way that China is able to take advantage of its rich 
culture and heritage to enhance the soft power it is seeking to wield with Tongan 
exchange students. China’s history is a rich source of soft power, as it is becoming 
increasingly attractive to other countries. China has made its history and culture 
more well-known by better advertising it on the world stage. One of the efforts made 
by China to make its culture more well-known is the use of “panda diplomacy” to 
develop people-to-people relationships with other countries using this cultural 
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symbol.209 This has contributed to the increasing attractiveness of study in China, by 
using such symbols to educate foreigners about Chinese culture and history. 
This has made it possible for China to enhance its soft power in Tonga by 
using scholarships to enable Tongan exchange students to experience Chinese history 
and culture. This is due to components of the scholarships themselves, which provide 
financial allowances that incentivise travel outside of the cities that they are studying. 
This is provided as a broadly-defined “living allowance”, a monthly payment made to 
exchange students as part of their study in China. This monthly payment varies 
depending on the type of degree that students are studying towards, ranging from 
1,400 yuan per month for undergraduate students or Chinese language students, to 
2,000 yuan per month for PhD candidates and senior scholars.210 This living 
allowance is provided in both of the major scholarships provided by China for Tongan 
students. These allowances are significant, because they allow exchange students 
studying in China to take part in activities outside of study in China. These allowances 
provide incentive for exchange students to visit other parts of China, because they are 
funded by the Chinese government. The terms and conditions of the scholarships do 
not specify what the living allowance must be used for, which further incentivises 
travel to learn more about Chinese history and culture. An example of the benefits of 
Chinese scholarships in allowing exchange students to travel in China to experience 
the history and culture is the case of two exchange students from New Zealand, who 
received a Chinese government scholarship. Students explain that they would spend 
their breaks between trimesters travelling in China to gain experience learning the 
language.211 The evidence highlighted here suggests that the living allowances 
provided by these scholarships are allowing students to travel to other parts of China 
to learn more about the country, which can enhance the soft power that China is 
seeking to wield in Tonga. 
 
 The final component of the scholarships provided by China for Tongan 
students to study in China that can be suggested to enhance its soft power is the 
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provision of language training. The literature on soft power has identified language as 
a critical component in a state’s soft power currencies, which can enhance the 
attractiveness of a state. Demand for Chinese language education is rising in the West, 
as China becomes a more important source of employment and business. China has 
already been shown to be actively using its language abroad to educate and attract 
foreign peoples through the establishment of Confucius Institutes. This use of 
language to enhance Chinese soft power has been expanded by the Chinese 
government to include exchange students who study in China. This is important to 
the Chinese efforts to enhance their soft power among Tongans, because providing 
language training ensures that exchange students are able to become fully immersed 
in Chinese society. The experiences of exchange students from other participating 
countries show the strength of language training in enhancing Chinese soft power. 
This is because their experiences can be considered to be similar to the experiences 
of Tongan students. The experiences of exchange students in China suggest that 
language education has become an integral part in enhancing China’s soft power. This 
is due to the growing sentiment from these students that an understanding of the 
language is necessary to fully appreciate the cultural nuances of China.212 
To take this into account, the Chinese Scholarship Council has made language 
training an important part of its scholarship programmes for Tongan students. This is 
usually in the form of a preparatory language class to be attended by exchange 
students before they commence their studies in China.213 This provision is included in 
the China-PIF scholarships and the Chinese Government scholarships, both of which 
are available to Tongan students. The inclusion of language training by the Chinese 
government in the scholarships it provides to Tongan students is significant, because 
it suggests that China wants to ensure that Tongan students are able to fully immerse 
themselves in Chinese culture and history. This can enhance the soft power 
opportunities for China among these students, as they will be better prepared to 
understand and appreciate Chinese culture. 
 
 This section has highlighted three mechanisms adopted by China in their 
scholarships to enhance the soft power that they hope to wield within Tonga. These 
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mechanisms are the type of accommodation provided, the allocation of living 
allowances, and the language training provided to exchange students. These 
mechanisms are important to China’s efforts at enhancing its soft power in Tonga, 
because they enable the Tongan exchange students to become more exposed to 
China’s culture, values and heritage. 
 
Scholarship Provision 
 
 The previous section analysed the scholarships provided by China for Tongan 
students to study abroad, which have been shown to have the ability to enhance 
Chinese soft power. This section seeks to analyse China’s provision of scholarships 
for Tongan students, and how this correlates with its increasing political and 
economic engagement with Tonga. To accomplish this, the section will first examine 
the role of the Chinese government in scholarship provision, to show how the 
government is involved in these scholarships. Following this, the yearly scholarship 
provision rates will be analysed to identify any trends and correlations between this 
and the political and economic engagement. Finally, the numbers of scholarships that 
are accepted by Tongan students will be analysed, to determine whether Chinese 
efforts to enhance its soft power among Tongan students have been successful. 
 
 The Chinese Government has operated its scholarship programme for several 
years, through its non-profit organisation, the China Scholarship Council, which is 
affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education. This organisation was established in 
1996, and is responsible for the implementation of scholarships for foreign students 
to study in China, and financial support for Chinese students studying abroad. The 
CSC plays a central role in the administration and provision of scholarships for 
foreign students. This is because the CSC is responsible for implementing the 
scholarships of Tongan students wishing to study in China. The CSC states that it is 
responsible for strengthening friendship and ties between the Chinese people and 
peoples of other countries through educational exchanges.214 The CSC goes on to 
state that it is responsible for educational, scientific, and cultural exchanges between 
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China and other countries, and also encouraging trade and economic cooperation.215 
This description of the role of the CSC suggests that the Chinese government is 
prioritising the use of scholarships as a form of soft power provision. This is due to 
the importance placed on strengthening the ties between Chinese peoples and the 
peoples of other countries, as has been shown by the objectives of the CSC. This is 
important for the analysis of Chinese provision of scholarships for Tongan students, 
and its correlation with soft power development in Tonga, because it shows that 
China considers education to be an important source of soft power. 
 
 China has gradually made scholarship provision in Tonga an important part of 
its bilateral relationship with the country. This is evident in the statistics surrounding 
China’s provision of scholarships to Tonga in the last decade. The provision of 
scholarships by China to Tonga can be considered a significant aspect of its 
programme to enhance its soft power in the country, at the same time that it also 
seeks to expand its political and economic engagement. This is due to the growing 
need to make ordinary Tongans more aware of China and its culture, as it seeks to 
expand its relationship. China’s provision of scholarships for Tongan students began 
at a relatively low level. The Tongan Government revealed that China provided 
between ten and fifteen scholarships for Tongan students in 2005.216 This suggests 
that China did not place such an emphasis on the importance of education as part of 
its quest for greater soft power, at this time. It may also suggest that China did not put 
much focus on soft power as it started to expand its relationship with Tonga. This is 
significant, because it suggests that China’s relationship with Tonga was not well 
developed at the level of people-to-people relations, due to the lack of expansion of 
education exchanges. This may be attributed to the China-Taiwan rivalry, which was 
a major factor in China’s engagement with the South Pacific during that period. To 
counteract this, China has used scholarships to study abroad to aid in the people-to-
people relationship it seeks to gain in the country. This is evident in the increase in 
yearly scholarship provision between 2005 and 2011. The Tongan government states 
that in 2011 the Chinese government made available thirty scholarships for Tongan 
students to study in China. This is an increase of one hundred percent on the 2005 
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figure. This figure suggests that China is putting increased focus on education as a 
soft power tool to develop its relations with the Tongan people. This is significant, 
because it is evidence of a greater effort by China to exert soft power within Tonga, as 
part of its bilateral relationship. 
The provision by China of scholarships for Tongan students to study in China 
has been shown to be a rapidly-evolving aspect of the bilateral relationship between 
the two countries. The rate of provision of these scholarships has been significant in 
influencing the soft power that China possesses in Tonga, as it has been suggested 
that many students who participate in Chinese education exchanges go on to become 
influential figures in their home governments. This suggests that the provision by 
China can be an effective tool for enhancing the soft power that it wishes to wield in 
the island state. 
 
Scholarship Acceptance 
 
 At the same time that China has increased its scholarship provision to Tonga, 
ever increasing numbers of Tongan students are accepting these scholarships to 
study in China. This is important for the analysis of how these scholarships enhance 
China’s soft power in Tonga, because the rate of acceptance by Tongan students 
provides insight into the effectiveness of Chinese soft power. The scholarship 
acceptance rates among Tongan students suggest an increasing desire to learn about 
China, and to gain a qualification from a Chinese institution. This suggests that China 
is becoming a more attractive destination among Tongan students. 
The statistics for scholarship acceptance among Tongan students shows that 
early on in its development, it was not an effective tool for developing soft power. 
Between 2003 and 2005 only six scholarships were accepted by Tongan students to 
study in China.217 This is broken down to two scholarships being accepted each year 
during this period.218 This is significant, because it highlights the issues facing China 
in its provision of scholarships early on in its relationship with Tonga. The low 
number of scholarships accepted by Tongan students between 2003 and 2005 
suggests that China’s scholarship programme was not an effective source of soft 
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power. Despite this, the number of Tongan students accepting these scholarships 
rapidly increased following the 2003-2005 period. From 2006 until 2010, 117 
Tongan students accepted scholarships to study in China.219 This scholarship 
acceptance reached a low of fifteen in 2008, and a high of twenty-nine in 2009.220 
 
These statistics suggest that China is becoming a more attractive destination 
for Tongan students. This could be attributed to the attractiveness of its culture, as 
China has become a more popular destination for international students. The 
increase in acceptance of these scholarships has come at the same time as China is 
increasing its bilateral relationship with Tonga. This suggests that China is placing 
more focus on these scholarships as part of its programme to enhance understanding 
of China by ordinary Tongans. This increase in popularity of Chinese scholarships is 
important for the soft power efforts being undertaken by China. This is because by 
having more Tongan students study in China, it increases the opportunities for 
ordinary Tongans to be educated about China and its culture, from the students who 
have studied there. The Tongan students who study in China on these scholarships 
play an important role in China’s push to enhance its soft power within the country. 
They act as sources of information about and attraction towards China, due to their 
experiences there and knowledge of its culture and values. This is important, because 
interactions between Tongans are more common than interactions between Tongans 
and Chinese government officials, so by exposing Tongan students to China and its 
culture the Chinese government is able to enhance its soft power more effectively 
than by directly intervening. The analysis of scholarship acceptance rates in Tonga 
has highlighted a correlation between the increase in scholarship acceptance and the 
expansion of the China-Tonga bilateral relationship. This correlation has been 
suggested to be a significant contribution to China’s quest for greater soft power in 
the country. 
 
 This section has analysed the Chinese government’s role in the provision of 
scholarships to study in China, and the effect that these scholarships may be having 
on Chinese soft power in Tonga. A correlation between the increase in scholarship 
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provision and acceptance rates, and the expansion of China’s bilateral relationship 
has been identified, which is significant to the discourse on Chinese soft power in the 
South Pacific. This can be suggested to be due to the role of soft power in paving the 
way for greater engagement between states. The following section will compare this 
relationship to the relationship China has with South Africa, to highlight similarities 
and differences in its relationships in each region. 
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4.4 Does the China-Tonga relationship compare to the rest of the world? 
 
The China-Tonga bilateral relationship has been shown to be making 
significant advances in the realm of soft power, largely through the use of 
scholarships for Tongan students to study in China. But how does this compare to 
China’s other relationships? To better appreciate the China-Tonga bilateral relations, 
it must be compared to one of China’s other relationships. To better understand this, 
China’s bilateral relationship with South Africa will be analysed in comparison to its 
relationship with Tonga. To accomplish this, the section will first examine the nature 
of China’s relationship with South Africa, in terms of politics, economics and culture. 
Following this, the acceptance rates of the same types of scholarships will be 
analysed. Finally, this will be compared to the China-Tonga relationship to identify 
similarities, differences and unique factors of China’s foreign relations with these two 
countries. 
 
 China’s bilateral relationship with South Africa is a significant one, due in large 
part to South Africa’s abundant natural resource wealth and geostrategic position. 
China’s relationship with South Africa is comparatively new, with official recognition 
only gained in 1998. Since then, China has rapidly expanded its relationship with 
South Africa, both economically and politically.221 It has also made progress in 
exerting its soft power within the country, as evidenced by a number of programmes. 
The political relationship between China and South Africa is based on reciprocal 
diplomatic visits, at multiple levels of government.222 This often takes the form of 
state visits by high-level diplomats. These high-level visits are focused on a number of 
issues important to both sides. Examples of important issues that have resulted in 
official visits are energy, trade, defence, and international development.223 Both 
countries are also members of the BRICS group, an association of emerging 
economies that are fast-growing. In 2012, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping visited 
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South African President Jacob Zuma.224 This meeting concerned the development of 
the China-South Africa Comprehensive Development Partnership, an important 
mechanism for strengthening their relationship. This is highlighted during Vice 
President Xi’s visit, where he stated that China will make joint efforts with South 
Africa to strengthen high-level visits, party exchanges, deepen communication, and 
optimise trade and mutual investment.225 This example highlights the significant 
political importance of the China-South Africa relationship, as it is a mechanism for 
advancing wider south-south relations. 
China’s economic ties with South Africa have formed an integral part of its 
wider bilateral relationship. This is due in large part to the importance of minerals to 
China, as part of its economic modernisation programme. South Africa’s mineral 
wealth forms a significant part of its economy, as is evidenced by its major exports. 
South Africa’s major exports are gold, platinum, diamonds, and other metals and 
minerals.226 This is important for China, as it relies on these minerals to drive its 
economic modernisation. China has also used trade as a way to develop its soft power 
in South Africa. This is evident in trade statistics, which show that in 2009 China was 
the largest export destination for South African goods.227 China also provides 
significant financial aid, in the form of loans. The Financial Times reported that China 
pledged $20 billion in loans to South Africa this year alone.228 This expansion of the 
trade relationship between China and South Africa, and the increasing provision of 
financial aid, highlights the importance that China places on the relationship. This is 
not to say that there are no concerns about the nature of this relationship. South 
African President Zuma identified the unbalanced nature of the trade relationship as 
a source of instability in the long term.229 This is significant, because it shows that 
South Africa’s leadership is aware of the possible repercussions of greater Chinese 
engagement. 
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China has also made greater efforts to enhance the cultural relationship that 
exists between it and South Africa. China has become more active in promoting its 
culture in South Africa, through a number of different mechanisms. These include the 
broadcasting of Chinese media into South Africa, the provision of language education 
for South African students, and the promotion of tourism.230 This change in approach 
by China was initiated in 2004 with a large cultural event titled “Bravo China – 
Chinese cultural tour to South Africa”.231 This tour consisted of a series of cultural 
activities aimed at “experiencing China”, which took place in South Africa. 232 This 
change in approach to the China-South Africa cultural relationship has resulted in a 
much greater exposure to Chinese culture for South African citizens, often in the 
areas of education and tourism. These measures include the provision by China of 
approved destination status for South Africa, which increases the number of Chinese 
tourist groups visiting the country.233 
China has introduced education exchanges for South African students to study 
in China, which enables them to experience Chinese culture and values. In 2006 there 
were three thousand South African students studying in China.234 The examples 
provided here highlight the evolving nature of China’s cultural relationship with 
South Africa, as it seeks to enhance the ties that bind the two countries. China’s 
evolving relationship with South Africa has evolved from a limited partnership based 
on trade and political recognition, to one that encompasses trade, political 
partnerships and culture. This highlights the significance of the relationship to both 
sides. 
 
 The acceptance rate for scholarships provided by China for South African 
students to study in China has undergone a significant evolution, as China becomes a 
more active player in South African society. China’s provision of scholarships to South 
African students began in 2003, at a relatively low level. Government statistics show 
that in 2004, four scholarships were provided for South African students to study in 
                                                        
230 MFA, “Bilateral Relations” 
231 Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa, "Ever-Deepening China-
South Africa Strategic Partnership 
232 Ibid 
233 Ibid 
234 Ibid 
85 
 
China.235 This figure is significant, because it suggests a low level of interest in these 
scholarships early on in the bilateral relationship. This may be the result of a number 
of factors, such as the limited nature of the relationship during this time, as China 
only began to put extra focus on its culture in 2004, the year after these scholarships 
began. The relatively low number of students who accepted Chinese scholarships in 
2003 suggests a correlation between it and the state of the China-South Africa 
relationship, which suggests that there is a link between the role of culture in 
bilateral relations and the attractiveness of student exchanges. This is because the 
expansion of the China-South Africa relationship led to the expansion of cultural ties 
between the two countries. Chinese feature heavily in South African history, being 
brought into the country by the Dutch as convict labour in the seventeenth 
century.236 This cultural history has been built on by China, with the establishment of 
Confucius Institutes across the country, to educate South African students about 
Chinese culture.237 This is significant for the analysis of soft power, because it 
highlights the importance of attractiveness as a key feature of soft power cultivation. 
As the China-South Africa bilateral relationship has evolved, so has the level of 
scholarship acceptance. In the period after the initiation of the “Bravo China” cultural 
programme, the rate of acceptance of Chinese scholarships has gradually increased. 
South African statistics show that the number of scholarships accepted increased 
from two per annum in 2004 to twenty-four per annum in 2012.238 During this period, 
a total of 113 scholarships were accepted by South African students to study in 
China.239 This is an average of twelve scholarships per year during the stated period. 
This is significant, because it highlights the increasing attractiveness of China as a 
destination for students. This suggests that the cultural programme introduced by 
China in 2004 has enhanced awareness, which in turn has made China a more 
attractive option for exchange students. This can be said to be enhancing the soft 
power being wielded by China in South Africa, due to the increasing numbers of 
students being exposed to Chinese culture and values during their time abroad. This 
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is significant, because it suggests that China’s use of scholarships as part of its wider 
cultural programme in South Africa is enhancing its soft power, which can be seen in 
the increasing numbers of students accepting the scholarships. 
 
 This analysis of the China-South Africa bilateral relationship, and the role of 
scholarships, has highlighted the nature of the relationship and the role that 
scholarships are playing in China’s quest for greater soft power in the country. The 
question that must be asked now is; does the China-South Africa relationship 
correlate to the China-Tonga bilateral relationship? Both are important to China and 
its foreign relations, yet each exhibit subtle differences in need of comparison. 
There are several similarities that are apparent in China’s bilateral relations 
with both countries, which suggest a common method of implementation by China of 
its foreign relations, such as the use of state visits and the recent focus placed on 
culture. The main similarities concern the approaches to political engagement, the 
role of culture, and the provision of scholarships by China in both countries. China 
places considerable emphasis on the role of state visits as part of its political 
engagement with both countries. This has been shown in the analysis of both 
bilateral relationships, as China has both made and received several state visits to 
and from Tonga and South Africa. Visits to both of these countries have frequently 
involved high-level officials and resulted in progress towards greater cooperation in 
various areas of concern to both parties.240 The use of state visits by China in Tonga 
and South Africa is important, because it shows that China considers elite-level 
relations to be a significant aspect of its foreign relations strategy. This is important, 
because it suggests that in this respect the China-Tonga relationship is not unique, 
compared to China’s wider foreign relations. China’s focus on culture can be seen in 
its bilateral relationships with Tonga and South Africa. This focus on culture in two of 
China’s bilateral relationships, in different regions, suggests that China considers 
culture to be an important part of all of its bilateral relationships. This is highlighted 
by the cases of cultural visits to both countries, and the role of Chinese media in both 
countries. The third similarity in China’s relationships with Tonga and South Africa is 
the use of scholarships as part of its engagement with these countries. This suggests 
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that scholarships are considered to be a valuable tool in China’s foreign relations 
strategy. The use of scholarships has been made evident in the bilateral relationships 
of both countries. 
The most important difference in the nature of China’s bilateral relationships 
with these countries is the role that economics plays in each. This is due to the large 
difference in the state of each country’s economy. Tonga’s economy can be 
characterised as being highly dependent on external factors such as China and its 
generous aid programme.241 In contrast to this, South Africa’s economy is built on a 
strong platform of mineral resources which has resulted in a strong economy that is 
an African leader, despite high unemployment.242 This difference in relationships has 
influenced the nature of the role that China plays in each. This is an important 
difference, which has had an effect on the way that China has approached its 
relationship with each country. The similarities and differences in China’s 
relationships with Tonga and South Africa, identified in this section, are significant to 
the analysis of how it uses soft power in its relationships. To better understand this, 
the following section will analyse the significance of these similarities and differences 
to the wider field. 
 
 The similarities and differences identified in the previous section are 
significant, because they provide insight into the role that education is beginning to 
play in China’s quest for greater soft power. These are important, because they 
highlight the growing importance of education to Chinese soft power, because they 
show that this is not an aspect unique to China’s relationship with Tonga. 
The similarities in China’s relationships with Tonga and South Africa are 
significant, because they show that the approach being used by China, specifically the 
use of state visits, culture and scholarships, is part of China’s wider foreign relations. 
China’s promotion of its culture in these relationships is significant, because it 
suggests that China considers culture to be a universal mechanism for educating the 
peoples of the countries it has relations with to its values, society, and actions. This is 
important, because the use of culture by China in both of these relationships relates 
significantly to the idea of soft power, due in large part to the attractive power of 
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culture. This suggests that China recognises it needs to focus on soft power to 
enhance its perception at the people-to-people level with other countries. The 
similarity in scholarship provision can be seen to be correlated with this, because the 
increase in scholarship acceptance by students in Tonga and South Africa can be 
suggested to have been caused by the increasing use of culture by China as part of its 
bilateral relationships. This is important, because it highlights the increasing 
importance of soft power to China’s foreign relations, especially when it has its soft 
power enhanced by students who were exposed to Chinese culture in China. As it was 
explained earlier, these scholarships are an effective source of soft power because 
they expose students to Chinese culture and values, which enables them to educate 
those in their home countries once they return. 
The main difference in the two bilateral relationships, in the nature of the 
economy, is also significant to the analysis of the role of education on Chinese soft 
power. The differing nature of each country’s economy, from highly dependent to 
strong if uneven, suggests that the use of education as a soft power tool is 
universalistic, because it is effective in countries that have very differing economic 
situations. This is significant, because it makes education a powerful tool for 
generating soft power. This is because it has been shown to be effective in a number 
of different scenarios. This difference in China’s relationships with Tonga and South 
Africa has proven to be a significant contribution to the soft power debate, because it 
shows that education is important to the provision of soft power, due to its 
universalistic nature. When combined with the attractive power of culture and the 
increasing awareness of China from its scholarships, both of which are evident in 
both of the relationships analysed, education has been shown to be an important tool 
in China’s soft power arsenal, because it is able to attract and educate students from 
other countries who in turn educate others about China. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
 China’s bilateral relationship with Tonga has been shown to feature high 
levels of dependence, due to an undeveloped tourism sector, weak exports and high 
debt, and ethnic tensions that set it apart from China’s other relationships in the 
region. China’s relations with the South Pacific feature several examples of hard and 
soft power, both of which heavily influence China’s standing in the region. To off-set 
the negative consequences of China’s engagement with Tonga, it has sought to 
undertake a number of programmes to enhance its soft power. Among these 
programmes, the provision of scholarships for Tongan students to study in China has 
become a significant part of China’s quest for greater soft power in Tonga. The 
provision of on-campus accommodation, travel allowances, and language training can 
attract these students to China, by educating them about its culture, values and 
history. The provision rates for these scholarships have been shown to be important 
to the analysis of China’s use of soft power in Tonga. 
This is because China has increased the number of scholarships it provides 
each year, as its bilateral relationship with Tonga has expanded. This can be 
suggested to reflect an increasing awareness on China’s part of the need to educate 
ordinary Tongans about its presence and nature. The rate of scholarship acceptance 
provides insight into the effectiveness of these scholarships in enhancing Chinese soft 
power. This is because there is a correlation between the increase in Chinese cultural 
programmes in Tonga, and the increasing numbers of students accepting these 
scholarships. This suggests that as Tongan students are becoming more educated 
about China; they want to travel to China to learn more.  These findings can also be 
seen in China’s bilateral relationship with South Africa, which also makes use of 
scholarships as part of its quest for greater soft power. The results of this analysis 
suggest that China is actively using these scholarships to enhance its soft power in 
Tonga, as it seeks to expand its political and economic engagement with the country. 
  
90 
 
Chapter Five: 
Conclusion 
 
 This thesis has examined the role of soft power in China’s foreign relations 
strategy, specifically the relationship between education and China’s bilateral 
relationship with Tonga. This paper has revealed a number of discoveries regarding 
the importance of scholarships as part of China’s quest for greater soft power in 
Tonga, to pave the way for greater political and economic engagement with the 
country. These discoveries were made possible by the limited nature of the existing 
scholarship on the role that soft power plays in China’s foreign policy, especially in 
regards to its relationship with Tonga. This decision was based on a review of the 
literature, which highlighted an absence of work concerning the role of education in 
China’s soft power approach in Tonga. Because of this, the thesis has analysed China’s 
provision of scholarships for Tongan students to study in China, and how this is 
paving the way for greater Chinese political and economic engagement with Tonga. 
The findings of the analysis can be considered to be an important contribution to the 
academic debate on soft power, and on China’s engagement with the South Pacific 
region as a whole, because it examines the recent Chinese use of scholarships as a 
form of soft power. 
 The analysis made in this paper has focused a number of key arguments. 
These arguments revolved around the nature of the China-Tonga bilateral 
relationship, how it compares to the wider region, and the use of scholarships by 
China. The analysis of the China-Tonga bilateral relationship has been important to 
the wider examination, because it has identified and analysed aspects of the 
relationship that can be considered unique, compared to the wider region. The 
analysis of Tonga’s dependence on China, and the ethnic tensions resulting from this 
greater dependence are important, because they suggest that Tonga’s dependence on 
China has created conditions favourable to greater Chinese engagement. The analysis 
of China’s relations with other South Pacific states is important, because it shows that 
China does not gain the type of natural resource access from Tonga that it does in 
other countries. China’s desire for natural resource access in countries like PNG and 
the Solomon Islands shows that China does not possess a dependent relationship 
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with the rest of the region. These analyses suggest that Tonga’s economic 
dependence has benefitted China, as it has enabled it to further develop the bilateral 
relationship. The comparison shows that this type of relationship is not evident in 
other parts of the South Pacific. The second part of the argument focused on the 
analysis of China’s use of scholarships in Tonga. The aim of this part of the argument 
was to test the hypothesis that China is using the scholarships to enhance its soft 
power, to pave the way for greater political and economic engagement. The analysis 
looked at China’s provision of scholarships and the rate of acceptance by Tongan 
students. The analysis of Chinese scholarship provision suggests that China is using 
them to enhance its soft power, because there is a correlation between the expanding 
relationship and the increase in scholarship numbers. The analysis of scholarship 
acceptance suggests that as the China-Tonga bilateral relationship has expanded, so 
has the number of students accepting scholarships to study in China throughout the 
South Pacific. To evaluate this argument against China’s wider policy, the China-
Tonga bilateral relationship was compared to China’s bilateral relationship with 
South Africa. This comparison involved looking at the similarities and differences of 
the two relationships, and how significant they are to the analysis. 
 The hypothesis that was tested in this thesis, that China is providing 
scholarships to enhance its soft power as part of its quest for greater political and 
economic engagement with Tonga, has led to a number of discoveries that are 
important for the field of soft power research. The most important discovery is that 
the number of scholarships being accepted appears to correlate with the expansion of 
China’s relationship with Tonga. This is important, because it suggests that these 
scholarships are enhancing China’s soft power, which is also allowing it to expand its 
political and economic engagement with Tonga. This goes some way to proving the 
hypothesis put forth at the beginning of this paper. Another discovery that is 
important for the academic debate is the finding that there is a correlation between 
the expansion of China’s bilateral relationship with Tonga and the provision of 
scholarships. The correlation between the increase in scholarships provided and the 
expansion of the relationship is important, because it suggests that China is aware of 
the effectiveness of education in generating soft power. This supports the hypothesis, 
because it shows that China is making more use of a soft power-generating tool at the 
same time as it is expanding its relationship with Tonga. The third important 
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discovery for the hypothesis is that this correlation between soft power and 
engagement is not necessarily unique to the China-Tonga bilateral relationship. The 
comparison of the China-Tonga bilateral relationship with the China-South Africa 
relationship has highlighted a number of important similarities, including the use of 
scholarships for students to study abroad. This suggests that China is adopting 
education-based soft power strategies across a number of its relationships. This is 
important, because it shows that the use of scholarships, while unique in the South 
Pacific, is not necessarily a unique aspect of China’s wider foreign strategy. These 
discoveries all contribute to supporting the hypothesis that China is using 
scholarships as a soft power tool to set the stage for greater political and economic 
engagement with Tonga. 
 The academic literature on China-South Pacific relations to date has focused 
primarily on the hard or coercive power being exerted by China in the region. This 
has meant that China’s soft power remains a relatively under-researched aspect of 
the field. This paper has challenged a traditional focus on hard power in China-South 
Pacific relations by academics. It has done this by focusing on a significant aspect of 
soft power, attraction created by education, analysing the role that this plays and the 
effect that it has had in Tonga. This analysis has challenged the view that hard power 
is the most important factor in China’s relations in the South Pacific. This is because it 
has suggested that soft power-based initiatives have proven effective at generating 
attraction towards China, an important factor in generating soft power. 
 
 The objective of this paper was to analyse an aspect of China’s relationship 
with the South Pacific that has not been examined previously as part of the academic 
field. In the course of this analysis, several key discoveries were made regarding this 
aspect of the studies of non-traditional diplomacy. The first new discovery that was 
made was the correlation between scholarship provision and relationship expansion. 
Prior to this research, the analysis of China-Tonga relations focused on hard power 
aspects, often at the expense of China’s growing soft power initiatives. This discovery 
is new, because research has not been previously undertaken that examines the 
provision of scholarships by China in Tonga. This is related to the second important 
discovery that was made in this paper; that the increase in scholarship acceptance by 
Tongan students correlates with the expansion of China’s bilateral relationship with 
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Tonga. This is a new discovery, because the research into the China-Tonga bilateral 
relationship has not previously examined the link between the increasing popularity 
of soft power initiatives and the expansion of Chinese political and economic 
engagement in their country. The third new discovery made in this analysis is related 
to the importance of the previous two discoveries. This discovery concerned the 
significance of China’s use of scholarships in Tonga to its wider foreign relations 
strategy. This analysis found that Chinese scholarship provision is not unique to its 
relationship with Tonga, because it is adopting the same initiative in South Africa. 
This discovery is new because the popularity of Chinese scholarships among Tongan 
students has not been compared with China’s other bilateral relationships. These 
three discoveries were made possible by the lack of previous research on the role of 
education in China’s bilateral relationship with Tonga. This opened up a significant 
gap in the academic research which this paper has striven to fill. 
 
 The research undertaken in this paper has contributed to the existing 
academic field on China-South Pacific relations, and to the field of Chinese soft power 
provision. This is due to the relatively modern nature of soft power, as a theoretical 
framework it is a relatively recent phenomenon. This contribution is significant, 
because it shows that China is increasingly turning to soft power as part of its 
bilateral relationships with other countries, in tandem with traditional hard power 
initiatives. This is significant for several reasons. The first reason why it is significant 
is that it shows that China’s use of scholarships in Tonga is connected to its wider 
foreign relations strategy, rather than a unique aspect of one relationship. This is 
significant because it shows that China values education as a key soft power tool in its 
foreign policy arsenal. As Nye highlighted when he established the theoretical 
framework of soft power, attraction is a key aspect of soft power, and the growing 
importance of education in China’s foreign policy arsenal shows that it recognises 
this too. The second reason why this contribution is significant to the academic field 
is that it recognises the importance of soft power to China’s global engagement. As 
Kurlantzick identified, China is increasingly turning to soft power as a means to 
reassure the rest of the world that it is not seeking to upset the traditional order with 
its rise. The findings of this paper contribute to this idea by highlighting the 
importance of soft power to an area that has not traditionally been a focus of Chinese 
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foreign policy. This is significant, because it shows that China is adopting soft power-
based initiatives across its relationships, not just in those it considers strategically or 
economically vital. This is important, because it shows how important soft power is 
and the increasing importance of it to the debate on China’s rise. The final reason why 
these findings are significant to the academic field on soft power is because it shows 
that the importance of soft power to the international relations debate is still growing. 
This is because soft power is becoming an increasingly significant part of the 
international relations debate, and the growing importance of it to state relations. 
This is significant to the international relations debate, because it signifies a possible 
change in focus of states from a hard power-focused foreign policy to one that 
emphasises and embraces fully the idea of soft power as the primary method for 
enhancing a states’ power within the international system. 
 
 This thesis has made an important contribution to the academic study of soft 
power in the field of international relations. This contribution is the exposure of the 
link between education as a soft power tool and the expansion of political and 
economic engagement. The role that education plays in creating the conditions 
necessary for greater political and economic engagement have not been widely 
examined, especially in relation to China’s relationship with the South Pacific. 
Education has been previously identified by scholars as a significant soft power tool 
in the arsenals of states. Despite this, there is only limited scholarship that analyses 
the relationship between this soft power tool and engagement. This thesis 
contributes to improving this scholarship by exposing a link between China’s 
provision of scholarships in Tonga and the expansion of its political and economic 
engagement with the country. This link has also been reinforced by comparing it with 
China’s relationship with South Africa. This finding highlights the importance of the 
thesis to the academic study of soft power. 
 
 This paper has analysed the role that education plays in China’s quest for 
greater soft power in Tonga, and how it relates to its expanding political and 
economic engagement with the country. This research has challenged the 
conventional focus on hard power in China-South Pacific relations, and has identified 
previously unknown knowledge of Chinese policies in its relationship with Tonga. 
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This has resulted in it making a significant and influential contribution to the 
academic debate on the role of soft power in Chinese foreign policy, how this relates 
to its wider aims, and the importance of soft power in general. 
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Chapter Six: 
Recommendations 
 
 The analysis undertaken in this paper has resulted in a number of 
recommendations that will guide future analysis of this topic. These 
recommendations focus on the scope of the analysis, the type of methodology used, 
and the limitations identified during this analysis. 
 The scope of the analysis undertaken in this paper was limited, due to a 
number of limitations experienced during the research process. Because of this, the 
analysis focused on a case study of a single state, and a comparison with a single state. 
This meant that the analysis was fairly limited in its findings and in the conclusions it 
reached. To better examine the field, future analysis of this subject area would be 
more effective if it were to widen the scope to include more South Pacific states in its 
analysis. This would allow the role of soft power in China’s South Pacific relations to 
be better understood and highlighted, as it will provide a much more comprehensive 
examination of China’s use of soft power. In addition to this, any future analysis 
should also consider broadening their comparison to include states in other parts of 
the world that have relations with China. This would make any future analysis more 
comprehensive, because it would enable China’s use of soft power in the South Pacific 
to be assessed against its relations with countries that are not widely similar to those 
in the South Pacific. This would enable China’s use of soft power to be assessed in a 
number of different environments. 
 The analysis undertaken in this paper was dictated in large part by the 
methodology, with the research method constraining the nature of the analysis. This 
affected the type of conclusion reached, as the analysis undertaken in this paper was 
constrained by the type of data that could be accessed. Any future analysis of this 
topic might consider a number of methodological changes from the approach adopted 
for this analysis. To better understand the effect that Chinese soft power is having in 
the South Pacific, an approach that measures opinions and attitudes among South 
Pacific peoples would be better placed. This could include the use of surveys, 
interviews, or other forms of quantitative research. This would be better able to add 
to the research in this paper, because it would measure the effectiveness of Chinese 
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soft power, unlike this research which assessed China’s soft power efforts. Adopting 
quantitative research methods for future analyses of this subject would complement 
the current research, adding a new dimension to the academic literature. 
 This research encountered several limitations, which constrained the scope 
and direction of the analysis. These limitations included issues around the sensitivity 
of the subject, issues around correspondence with foreign diplomats, and the nature 
of the subject area.  The research focused on the issue of China-Tonga relations, 
which is considered somewhat of a sensitive subject by certain actors. This led to 
barriers being erected that prevented the author from obtaining information that 
would assist in the research. One such problem that arose from the issue of 
sensitivity was the unwillingness of the Chinese Embassy in Nuku’alofa to respond to 
requests for information on its scholarship programme. This made it difficult to 
obtain statistics regarding scholarship provision for the period that the embassy in 
Nuku’alofa was solely responsible for this programme. This made it difficult to obtain 
information for the research that was undertaken. These limitations were also 
evident in the attempts at correspondence with various South Pacific governments. 
As part of the research process, the author attempted to make contact with several 
South Pacific governments to obtain information and statistics regarding their 
relationships with China. During this process, the author failed to hear back from a 
number of governments, including those of Samoa, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and 
Vanuatu. This made it difficult to attempt a regional case study of Chinese soft power, 
which led to the decision to focus on the China-Tonga bilateral relationship. The third 
limitation that arose from the analysis was the lack of prior research in this particular 
subject area. This lack of prior research was a limitation, because it meant that there 
were no materials to use as a guide for framing the research. This provided a lot of 
freedom in how the analysis was conducted, but it also meant that the relevance of 
the analysis had to continually be ensured, so as not to stray off topic. These 
limitations influenced the way that the analysis and research was undertaken, but 
there are a number of recommendations that can minimise the effects of them. 
To ensure effective data collection, correspondence should be started as early 
as possible with government departments and foreign embassies, to ensure as much 
time as possible to collect data. Where possible, contacting the person or department 
that is responsible for the subject your data is related can help in getting a prompt 
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response. To adopt a qualitative research approach, it is suggested that travelling to 
the country that the research is focused on will ensure that survey collection can be 
undertaken. This is because a problem that arose during research was the need to be 
in the country to undertake survey distribution. The limitations identified in this 
section have affected the way that research was undertaken for this paper. This in 
turn affected the type of analysis that was undertaken, focusing on qualitative rather 
than quantitative analysis. To ensure that quantitative research is possible, the 
recommendations that were identified during the course of research for this paper 
can prevent similar issues from re-occurring. 
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